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It is an exploratory study on the micro-management 
of a small commune-run farm machinery marufacturing and 
repairing factory in Southern China. After tracing the key 
historical events of the factories , considerable attentions 
has been paid to analyzing its present authority structure, 
management systems and the managerial styles of the leaders.
Besides, much emphasis are put on revealing the 
workers' grievances towards the leaders and their own jobs. 
At the end, the current managerial problems of the factory 
are discussed a nd some built-in structural constraints of 
the socialist system are proposed to be the underlying con­
duciveness for the occurance of the management problems in 
the factory.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1
SECTION ONE : OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Throughout the thirty years of China's industrial
development, the national policies on the factory manage-
ment systems has been altered for many times.(Andors,1977).
The "one-man management" system adopted from the Soviet
Union was practised in the early 1950s.It was then re-
placed by the system of "factory manager responsibility
unber leadership of the Party Committee" and the "two part-
icipation, one reform and triple combination system" in the
period of Great Leap Forward. But during 1961-1963, it
was reemphasized again. From 1964-1966, the revolutionary
management model was advocated. The model put great
emphasis on the principle of politics in command, party
leadership, mass campaigns and workers' participations in
the factory management. Untill 1976, it was still the
official managemnet model. Only after the fall of the gang
of four, it has been de-emphasized, and more attentions has
beenput on the funvtions of money incentives and the econo-
mic achievemet of the factories.
2The fluctuation of policies are mainly due to the
different view points held by the Communist Party leaders
on what form of management is most appropriate to the
socialist system in China. In principle, as the means of
production are claimed to be publicly owned and. the workers
are regarded as the masters rather than as employees, the
management system which implicitly implies the power relat-
ions between the workers and the factory should be different
from that of the capitalist society. The differences in
status, privileges and Ywork natures betvveen the workers
and the leaders should be minimized so as to prevent the
bureaucratic domination of the latter on the former. The
as an economic organ-
factory should not be taken simply
ization and the factory management should be primarily a
political one which gives priority to the political and
collective objectives of the socialist construction, and to
the socialist teansformation of the workers and leadem
rather than to the economic and. individual intorost e But
such management model semes to be incompatible with the
promotion of efficient economic production. For many times,
3it was replaced by the management system which put more
emphases on economic and effeciency, in stead of on politics
and equality.
In view of these, the objectives of this exploratory
case study are:
(1) To understand the micro-management of a Chinese factory
under the socialist context, including its authority struct-
ure, management system, the managerial styles of the leaders,
and with emphasis on hoed the workers rerce ve their ow
assigned joj the working conditions, and also the. leaders
of the factory.
(2) To trace some of the structural constraints in the'
socialist system that impose on the managment system and
cause some of the managerial prcblers in tlhe factory,
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ECTION TWO: RESEARCH : IETRODS
Participating in the "Commnune and Socio-economAic
Development in the People's republic of China" project
organized tinder the auspices of the Social Research Centre,
CUHK, I have the opportunity to do research in the Huan-
cheng Commune, Guangdong Provnce.1 I avail of this chance
to study the factory management in one of its commune-run
factories 2 --- the Huan-cheng Farm Machinery Hanufactory and
reparng Factory.
In view of the fact that the studies on China's
management systems are mostly based can documentary survey
(Aridors, 1977; Hoffmann., 1974) and government arranged
formal interviews (Richman, 1969; Rettelheim 1974), I
decided to conduct an indepth case study on that field,
with the intention to understand vi1 actual feeli I? s s attitudes
and opinions of the workers towards their leaders, the
authority structure, the management system, as well as their
autloobks on their present assigned ed jobs. As I have been
5
aware of the fact that it is very difficult to get the real
opinions and feelings of the workers through the formal
interview arranged and accompanied by the leading cadres,
I made the request of investigating the factory "on-the-
spot"3 (i.e. participant observation). The leading cadres
of the Office of Industry and Transportation (CIT) in the
commune, as well as the general. manager of the factory
kindly allowed me to do so.
My field work lasted for 25 days (from 16 July to 8
August 1979). During these days I spent 2/3 of day time in
the factory (either in the office or in the workshops)
informally interviewing the leaders and chatting with the
workers. Moreover, I also partcipated in their daily activities,
both inside the factory (e.g. attending their factory manage-
ment committee meetings and workers' assemblies) and outside
the factory (e.g. Home-visitings, picnicking, swimming and
harvasting). The data gathered were immediately sorted out
and re-organized. Throughout the field trip, I was well
accepted by the workers and the leading cadres in both the
6
factory and the OIT
The information gathered in this field visit are
from 3 major sources: (1) from the OIT: the raw data
concerning the composition of workers in the factory: (2)
from the factory leading cadres: mainly the documentary data
concernin the details of the management systems, the formal
authority structure of the factory, the history, the, business
network and also their work attitudes and opinions towards
the workers; (3) from the workers: the data concerning the
history of the factory, the it perception on the ladi ng cadres
and the authority structure of the factory, their responses
towards the money incentives system, and their outlook, on
their present assigned jobs.
These data are re-organized-and but into the two
main chapters of this thesis: Chapter 2 and Chapter3.
Chapter 2 is written on the historial development of the
factory before 1978. For the sake of convenience, T delineate
the historial development by dividing it into periods which
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mark the sigrificant changes of the factory (e. g. changes
in ownership, size, work organizations etc.). Before 1972,
the factory could be regarded as in its pre--mature phaze dur-
ing which it constantly faced the danger of being closed
down. In the years 1973- 19779 it entered into its mature
phaze in a sense that it gradually grew in size, earmed pro-
fits and became more stable. Its management systems and work
orb nizations became more structured. The development
during this period were the basic context in which the
current affairs occurred. Chapter 3 shows the current sit--
cation of the factory. It gives a full description of the
following dimensions of the factory: compositions of the
employees, authori qty structure, grievances of the workers,
and the newly introduced money incentive system, In cha Dter
4, I try to analyze the factors leading to the current
situation in the factory especially on the upsurge of gric-
varices of the orkers, At last, I put =or1ard some of the
structural constraints , nich imp os e on the factory by thsocialist system id I p__ opose--
socialist system and I propose that are some of the
structural sources of the workers' grievances.
8
SECTION THREE: LIMITATIONS
If possible, I think it would be better to have a
state-owned factory as a case for studying the factory
management system and its impacts on the different dimen-.
tions of the factory. It is because the management systems
of the state--owned factories are usually more formalized' than
that of the commune-run factories. In addition, as the organ-
izational structure of the state-owned factoryie s are in general
more hierarical and differential, the changes in the management
systems involved the variations of more dimensions, and hence
the information provided from the case would probably be .richer.
As my research opportunity was limited to the Huan-cheng
Commune-run factories, I could only choose the most developed
and structured factory among them-- the Huan-cheng Farm
Machinery Manufacturing and Repairing Factory. As my research
proceeded, I found that the factory had serious managerial
problems whdch were mainly due to the resentments of the
workers towards the leaders and their present ,jobs. Such
9
management problems revealed to certain extent the defects
of the management systems in the socialist context This
is one of the reasons why I keep on concentrating on this
factory though I aware of the its limitations.
10
NOTES ON CHAPTER ONE
1. Huan-cheng Commune is located in the Pearl River Delta
Region of South China, Under the administrative juris-
diction of the Foshan Prefecture of Guangdong Province.
It is one of the 20 communes of Xin Hui County and is
situated in the close vicinity of Hui-cheng, the capital
town of the county. It is basically an agricultural
community, cultivating a total land area of 4,580
hectares. It is composed of 1 town (Huan-cheng Town,
which had been an administrative sub-region of the Hui-
cheng before the Cultural Revolution), and 29 brigades.
In 1978, the Huan-cheng Commune had 10,600 households
with a total population of about 60,000. Of this copulat-
ion, 89,5% were classified as agricultural population
and 10.5% were Huan-cheng Townsmen. Among the Huan-cheng
Townsmen, 2.5% were industrial workers, working in the
Huan-cheng Commune-run factories, Huan-cheng Town street
factories, or in the enterprises at Hui-cheng Town.
2. In 1979, there were altogether 11 industrial enterprises
at commune level in Huan-cheng Commune. They were the
farm machinery manufacting and repairing factory, the
paper mill, the construction team, the food and oil
processing factory, the transportation team, the palm-
leaf fans manufactory, the palm leaves sun-drying field,
the farm machinery station, the brick field, the plastic
bag manufactory, and the printing shop.
3, That is what the indigenous people call "Dun Dian" (蹲点).
4. When I asked the workers their personal attitudes and
opinions about the factory and the leaders, I seldom took
11
notes in front of therm. Because taking notes before
them would increase their tensions and ,lake them nervous
in expressing their oven ideas. Therfore, I usually
memorize the conversations and drop them down whenever I
had a chance.
5.The nomes of all the persons involved have been fictional-
ized in order to prevent any inconveniencas lead to them.
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF THE FACTORY 1
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SECTION ONE: BEGINNING: 1958: THE GRIT LEAP FORWARD
Commune Party Committee (CPC), Office of Industry and
Transportation (0IT) and the Factor.
During the period of the Great Leap Forward, the
commune began to develop its own industrial and agricultural
enterprises, as a response to the Party's call.2 This fact-
ory was among one of them. It was established in June, 1958,
located within the Commune Headquarters, occupying the right-
hand-side section of the office building, Without its own
separate factory building.
Administratively it was under the direct supervi-
sion of the office of Industry and transportation OIT
which was an agency of the Commune Party Committee( CPC),
in charge of all the enterprises at commune level.
Both its general manager and deputy manager were
appointed by CPC. The concrete production tasks of the fact-
14
were set by the CPC and CHIT at different seasonal periods,
There were no specific out-put value targets or profit in-
dicators to fulfilled. The goal of this factory was to
支 农 ). If there was a"rain agriculture" ( zhinong
loss, the sum would be compensated by the commune. And
if there was a profit, it had to be turned over to the com-
rune. Hence, the factory was only an accounting unit, not
an independent economic unit.
Workers
10
At the beginning, there were only ten persons in
the factory. They were indigenous Huan-cheng peasants who
knew nothing about industrial skills. The only exception
( 陸 平 ) .was Liu-ping
Before 1949, Liu-ping had worked in a small hardware
sweatshop at Hui-cheng Torn for many years. During Land Re-
form, he came back to his native village( Daz Jiao
in Huan-cheng and took part in the propaganda Tear. In June,
大 滘 )
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1958, he was appointed by the OIT as the deputy manager in
this factory and made responsible for conducting production
affairs.
At that time, the general manager was L i ang-neng.
Although Liang-neng was unprofessional in production, old,
and afflicted with serious illness, his status as an old
Party member enabled him to occupy the position of general
manager. At the end of '1959, he returned.
The factory 17radually absorbed more and more pea-
sants from different brigades. By the second half of 1959,
the number of workers had increased to 40. They were di-
vided into 2 groups: the benchwork group and the iron forge
group. The one who was comparatively skillful at work be-
cause the master worker as well as the head of the group.
Specific tasks were assigned to the group leader by the
deputy manager and then the whole group worked collectively.
16
Distribution System
During the Great Leap Forward period, the factory
did not have any wage system. The workers( in fact they
were peasants from production teams), were not paid by
the factory. They worked here but were allotted work-
points and quota of grains from their production teams.
They brought rice to the factory and the factory only pro-
vided them with water. They called the situation as bring
带 米 吃 水 ). Atrice, drink water" (Dai Mi Chi Shui
meals, they got food from the commune's "canteen cauldron"
( Da Guo Fan
Not until the second half of 1959 did the worker
receive some pocket money from the factory every month.
Through public appraisal of their political and work att-
itudes, they were classified into three grades: the "adv-
anced position"(shangyou 上游 )
"middling position"
and "backward position" (xiayou(zhongyou 中 游 )
下 游 )
Firstly the worker had to give an overall
大 □ 飯 ) .
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evaluation of his own performance during the group meeting.
He gave himself a grade. Then through discussion, the
group would reach a grade for him. But the final decision
on what grade he should be in was made by the general
manager. The whole procedure was called San Bang Ding An"
( 三 榜 定 案 ） (list the worker's name on the roll for
three times, and then fix a final grade for him). Those
placed in the advanced positions would receive 11.5.00 for the
month, and those in middling and backward positions
would only have 3.00 and 2.00 respectively.
As it was the first time for the commune cadres to
run factories, they did not have.any experience in amnaging
industrial enterprises. Their ways of organizing and
mobilizing workers were mainly borrowed from the field man-
agement practised in the agricultural sector. The public
appraisal in determining different grades of return to work
was quite obviously a managerial form copied from the "self-
assessment and public discussion" (Zi Bao Gong Yi 自 报
of work-point allotment in the production teams.公 议 )
18
As far as the formal organization of the factory was con-
cerned, there were no formal rules or regulation in black
and white 0
The degree of differentiation, in both horizontal
and vertical dimensions was low. Production collectively
within the group and the group head was in charge of the
coordination among workers. The assignment of work was
done by the deputy manager. The general manager, besides
handling the political affairs and education in policy,
also took up the roles of cashier and accountant. The hi-
erarchical structure of the factory could be differentiated
into four levels: the general manager, the deputy manager,
the group heads and the workers who were, of course, in the
majority.
Equipment and Products
Since the factory only had 500.00 as capital, some
19
of the simple tools had to be made by the workers with indi-
genous methods. They made their own pincers, drills, files,
iron hammers and knives etc. The iron used to make these
tools was supplied by the commune's steelworks. Other
more complicated equipment, such as pincer pliers and bel-
lows were bought from the workshops in Hui-cheng 'won.
Sometimes when the needed equipment was not on sale, the
deputy manager would request his ex-co-workers in the Hui-
cheng workshops to make it for him. At this period, the
factory did not have any machine tools. its main tasks
were repairing and producing fittings for agricultural
implements, irrigation, and drainage equipment. Sometimes
they produced products like iron ploughs, threshers, tri-
cycles, and iron frames for construction. The production
and repair services of the factory were planned in view of
the special stuationcf the agricultural development in the
commune
20
SECTION TWO: MERGER: 1959- 1960
MerEed with Huan-cheng Steelworks
At the end of 1959, the CPC and OIT decided to merge
the Huan-cheng steelworks with this factory. The Huan-cheng
Steelworks was established during the mass movement of
smelting iron and steel in the Great Leap Forward.
Owing to the low quality of iron and steel produced,
the steelworks had been suffering a loss. In the name of
merging,it was actually disbanded. All the workers and
staff were assigned to this factory. Consequently, the
number of workers in this factory increased to 140. More
work groups were formed and each was now composed of 30 to
40 workers.
Merged with the Wooden Farm Tools Cooperative
21
In 1960, the CPC and OIT thought that as both the
Wooden Farm Tools Cooperative3 and the farm machinery and
repair factory were enterprises producing agricultural
implements, it was more appropriate to have them merged
together. It was supposed that if these two enterprises
were put onto the same line of production, they could share
raw materials with each other. Such a merger would be
mutually beneficial to each of the enterprises concerned
and, moreover, the resultant larger enterprise would gain
much fame for the commune as compared to other similar type
but smaller factories set up by other communes.
In actual practice, however, the merger seemed to
be only in name. These two enterprises still kept to their
own ways in work organization and management. Neither ent-
erprises moved, and the workers of each went back to their
own workshops to work. The merger did not lead to any fur-
ther communication between the workers in these tow separate
factories. Besides, they kept separate accounts. They
were two independent accounting units. Thus, in name they
22
were one, but in reality they were two.
Workers and Management
At the end of 1959, the CPC and OIT asked Liang-
neng to retire. Wen-tiao who had just come
back from the army, was appointed the general manager. He
was concurrently the Party branch secretary of the factory.
Liu-Ding was still the deputy manager, in charge of the
production affairs.
From 1960 onwards, workers received fixed salaries.
The CPC and OIT set the quota( i.e. number of workers) and
amount( i.e. the fixed salary) for each grade. Through
public appraisal, as practised before, every worker was
given a grade. Corresponding to their grades, they received
their fixed salaries each month. The salary of the general
manager( 40.00) was determined by the CPC. But the
salary of the deputy manager was appraised by the mass. It
( 文 □ )
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was $35.00. At that time, the lowest salary was :16.00,
and the mode lay in the range from E20.00 to U30.00. The
highest salaried workers were twelve technicians who had
4
been transferred from the state enterprises to this factory
They were paid by the factory at their original salary
levels, ranging from Y40.00 to Y50.00. The acted as tech-
nical advisers. They worked together with other workers
and did not hold any administrative posts.
W-.nen. asked about the management of the factory,
Liu--ping said there was still no formal management system
and the situation was chaotic. Due to the sudden increase
of workers, the old work organization had been disrupted
while the new one had not yet developed. As the size of the
factory suddenly tripled, the existing work norms were
weakened. Moreover, when the fixed salary system was int-
roduced and the workers were no longer paid according to
their immediate work done, some of them became indolent.
As a result, although there were more people taking part
in the work and the factory obtained sufficient tasks, 5
24
the productivity was even lower than before.
25
SECTION THREE: CLOSING DOWN: 1960- 1962
At the end of 1960, the agricultural production in
the commune suffered serious setbacks. Consequently, a
large portion of the tasks in the factory was out back and
it suffered a loss. Under this depressing situation, the
CPC and OIT decided to close dovrn the factory.6 Workers
and staff were dismissed in three successive batches. The
first batch of 100 workers was dismissed at the end of '1960.
The second dismissal followed one year after, when about
twenty odd people were sent away. The third dismissal
occurred in October 1962, and in the end only seven workers
and staffs were left behind in the factory.
Among the laid off workers, some found jobs in
factories or other departmental units, such as the supply
and marketing department and the commerce department, thy:--
ough their own informal connections. The technicians trans-
ferred from the state enterprises were sent back to their
.
original working places. Those who still had their domicile
26
to the factory or town could either remain there or trans-
fer to other commune-run enterprises. Whether they would
remain or be transferred was totally the decision of the
CPC and OIT.
SECTION FOUR: ABANDONED BY THE COMMUNE: 1962- 1965
Transference of Ownership
In October 1962, there were only seven people left
in the factory. Since the factory was continuing incurred
a loss, the CPC and OIT decided to give it to the "Handi-
crafts Industry Unified Cooperative's( HIUC) (Shou Gou
which was an agency of theGye Liar She 手 工 业 联 社
"Handicrafts Industry Administration General Office
手 工 业 局( HIAGO)( Shou Gon Gye Ju at the county
level. The CPC and OIT thought that the commune should
only run factories that made a profit, and that such fact-
ories as were non-profit snaking or suffered loss, should be
run by the HIAGO. In return, the HIUC paid Y200.00 per
month to the commune for depreciation of the factory build-
ing and equipment.
After the transference, this seven-man factory
became. a seven-man cooperative. 7 It changed its name and
28
was known as “the farm machinery producer's cooperative”
Nong Xie Sheng Chan He Zue She 农 机 生 产 合 作 社 ) .
As the cooperative was not a directly affiliated factory
( Zhi Shu Chang 直 属 □ ) of the HIAGO, adriinistrat-
ively it was still under the supervision of the OIT. That
meant, as far as policies and political directives were
concerned, it was still under the direct control of the
commune authority.
As for the vocational work, the cooperative had to
bear the responsibility to the HIUC. Unlike the OIT, the
HIUC did not only set concrete production tasks for the
cooperative, it also provided the latter with the necessary
raw matherials. Moreover, the marketing of the products
was also under its arrangement. The profits the cooperative
made no longer belonged to the commune. 50% of the profit
was used for the cooperative's expanded reproduction 15% was
distributed among the members as bonus and the rest was
turned over to the HIUC.
29
Workers and the Management-System
Liu-ping, the original deputy manager of the fact-
ory, was now.the director of the seven--man cooperative,
with Fang-hong ), the lathe operator, acting方 洪
as his assistant. Both of them were Party members. Due
to the small size of the cooperative, Liu-ping was in
charge of both production and political affairs. He was
responsible for assigning tasks to each worker and setting
the time rate for every piece of work. The weekly workers
assumbly was also convened by him and he had the final say
in both political and production decisions within the
cooperative. He represented the cooperative in attending out-
side meetings. Whenever he was not. in, N ang--hong had to
take his place in conducting production procedures.
Fang-hong, was originally a peasant in the Nang
S
-). He was born in 1930 andEng brigade( 南 庚 大 隊
entered the factory in July 1958. In addition to the posts
of lathe operator and assistant director, he concurrently
30
worked at night as part-time accountant. In return, he
earned an extra amount of .6.00 per month. Besides him,
Ye-qing ( 叶 青 ) , the plane.r, also acted as part-time
cashier and gained 4.50 as reward. The other four were
ordinary workers. Among them, three were benchworkers
and one was a smith.
When the factory was transformed into a cooperative,
,he HIUC fixed the monthly salary of all the members at
28.00. Each of the members had to give one month's salary
over to the cooperative as shares and 10% of the first
month's salary( i.e. 2.80) as an entrance fee. The
lump-sure so obtained was used to purchase the immediate
necessary equipment, raw matherials and stationery. At
this amount of money distributed evenly among the seven
members as a bonus.
As the enterprise continued to gaining a certain
amount of profit ever since it had been transformed into
a cooperative, each member of the cooperative an average
31
received U22.30 as bonus for every quarter, from October
1962 to December 1965. Besides the bonus the exceed-time-
道 工 时rate reward system( Chao Deng Shi Jiang Li. Zhi Du
was also introduced. The director not only
奖 励 制 度 ）
assigned specific tasks directly to individual workers,
but also set a time-rate for each piece of work. If a
worker managed to finish the job earlier, the time he saved
would be recorded and added up at the end of each month.
If he exceeded the time limit, the additional hours he used
would be deducted from the hours he had previously saved.
The total number of hours saved( or exceeded) would be
converted into money terms, based on the worker's average
hourly salary,8 and would be paid in cash in addition to
（ or would be deducted from) his monthly basic salary.
It was quite usual for the workers to get u20.00 to 30.00
a month extra in this way. make Fang-song for example, at
that time his basic salary was Y28.00, in addition to his
extra pay of Y6.00, he also. managed to get about 11.28.00 as
saved-time award. Therefore his total income per month was
more than '160.00. Including the bonus, his annual income
32
was about 800.00. There was no limit set on the amount
of bonus an individual worker could get. This reward
system lasted until 1966, when the cooperative was once
again switched back to commune ownship.
Equipment and Products
The farm machinery producer's cooperative did not
install any new machinery. All the machine tools were hand-
ed down from the farm machinery and repairing factory.
There were three lathes: two C615 (one was home-made, the
other onw was a prize from the county authority in October
1959) and one C618 (the county authority gave it as part
of its quota system and was paid by the factory in October
1959), and also one shaping machine (a prize from county
authority in October 1959).
The products made in that period were mainly small
farm implements like sickles, iron ploughs, and threshers.
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These product tasks were set by the HIUC. In addition, the
cooperative also undertook running repairs for farm machines
and other electrical appliances from the brigades as well
as from Huan-cheng Town and Hui-cheng Town.
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SECTION FIVE: BACK TO THE COMMUNE: 1966
Becoming Commune Owned Again
Since the factory had been transformed into a
cooperative, it had continuously gained profits. From
the last quarter of 1962 to the end of 1965, it managed to
make '11,500.00 of profit. Under such circumstances, the
commune authorities wanted to have it back again. In 1965,
the CPC and OIT made a formal request to the HIUC and they
finally gained the factory back in January 1966. Thus,
once again the factory was turned into a commune-run enter-
prise and it was formally known as Huan-cheng Farm Machin-
ery Manufacturing and Repairing Factory.
New Wage System: The Black Ten Grades
As the factory was so longer a cooperative, the
money paid for the shares was returned to the workers (each
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X28.00). Both the bonus system and the exceed-time-rate
reward system were abolished by the CPC and OIT. Instead
they followed the wage system of the palm-leaf industry 9
factory.( See Table 2.1)
Not only were the corresponding wages for every
grade determined by the CPC and. OIT, but the number of
workers allowed at each grade was also fixed by them. Exa-
cept for the general manager, whose grade was set by OIT,
all the other workers and staff were assigned to their
grades through public appraisal as described before. But
still, the final determination had to be approved by the
OIT.
The workers disliked this new wage system and
they informally called it the Black Ten Grades( Hei
No matter whether they comparedShi Ji 黑 十 级
it with their original wage level or with other factories
of the same industry, it was on the low side. workers
were unwilling to have wages far below their original
36










3rd year of apprenticeship 18.00
2nd year of apprenticeship 10.00
14.00
1 st year of apprenticeship
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level, and consequently “additional half grades” were
devised as a temporary compromise. Fang-bong was one
example. During the period of the seven-man cooperative
his average monthly salary had been :.'54.00( excluding his
extra pay of u6.00 for being a part-time accountant). In
this new wage readjustment, he asked for the seventh grade
wage level( i.e. 51.00), but was finally classified
C by appraisal) in the sixth grade( i.e. `1 f5.00). He
strongly objected to the appraisal. The matter was finally
settled when the four parties involved( the OIT, the gen-
eral manager, the majority of the workers, and he himself)
finally agreed to have him assigned to a new grade-- the
six-and-a-half-th grade--- which-enabled h--:m to get Y4900
as his monthly salary.
Although the OIT made some concessions and toler-
ated the workers bargaining for the additional half grade
the workers were not satisfied with the wage system as a
whole. As far as the wage system was concerned, they ident-
ified themselves with the industry rather than with the fact-
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ory. The workers in this jndustry-- farm machinery build-
ing-- were in general regarded as skilled workers. With
similar labour grades, their salaries were usually higher
than those of the semi-skilled and non-skilled workers in
the light industries in the same region. At that time,
the wage scale for the near-by county level machinery
factories was much higher than in this commune-run fact-
ory. Apprentices in the former received I.$20.00, $22.00,
26.00 per month in respect of their first, second and
third years of apprenticeship. The first five labour
grades of regular workers received respectively '$32.00,
u37.00,=L 3.00, LE8.00 and 1655.00 as monthly salaries.
The highest monthly salary among, them was `72.00. Thus
the differences between the two wage scales in the same
industry were large. They ranged from $6.00 to $21.00
(comparing the corresponding minimum and maximum salaries
on both scales). The major reason accounting for the dis-
parity was that the factories were set up by two different
sectors of ownership: the collective sector and the state-
owned'secor. The state-owned factories followed the eight-
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grade wage system passed down from the central government,
but the commune-run there was no unified wage system laid
down by the government.
Before the Cultural Revolution, the planning of
wage systems for commune-run enterprises was completely in
the hands of the commune authorities. The central govern-
ment had not given any concrete instructions except for a
very general principle. The commune authorities were told
to initate the wage systems of the state-owned enterprises
when setting up wage systems for their own enterprises, and
the incomes of the workers should not be too much higher
than those of the peasants in the same region. Basing them-
selves on this general guide line, each of the commune auth-
orities searched for the appropriate wage systems for their
own enterprises. In practice, they usually kept the wage
level lower than that of the state-owned enterprises. This
was one of the major sources of grievance among the workers
in the commune-run enterprises.
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SECTION SIX: CULTURAL REVOLUTION10: 1967- 1969
It was said that the Cultural Revolution had not
much impact on the factory. 1 During that period, the
factory was neither involved in any of the gang-warfares,
nor did it hold up work so as to carry out revolution
( Nao Ger ng On the contrary, in small fact-鬧 革 命
ories like this one, nothing very serious happened. Some
of the big factories in the towns and cities stopped work
an l engaged in "revolution ties establishment"( Gao Ohuan
Lian and faction struggles( Pai Xi Dou搞 串 联
派 系 斗 争 However although the production inZZheg
the big factories was interrupted, there was no sudden in-
crease in the work load of the small factories. At that
time the main task for this factory was repairing and the
work load was just average
Although the Cultural Revolution was alleged to have
had little influence on the normal production of the factory,
the workers conceded that it still had sore impact on the
Political education within the factory. -During that period,
於 活 動
the three loyal movement 12( San Zhong Yu Hun Done 三 忠
was launched. Political meetings were more
frequent. In the meetings, the general manager or the app-
ointed worker delegate read out newspaper articles, quotat-
ions from Chairman Mao, and the documents that came down
from above. Twice everyday, just like saying prayers,13
all the workers had to and in front of Chairman Mao's
portrait, swearing to be forever loyal to Mao Tse-tung in
the morning and reporting their work done in the evening.
In 1969, a revolutionary leading group( Ge Ming
was set up in the factory. TheLing Dao Xiao Zu 革 命 領 導 小 組
original general manager, Liu-ping, became the group leader.
關Three other workers. r ana--hone. Ye-a inz and Guan-shui
were appointed to be members. Liu-ping, as before,水 )
was responsible for all aspects of the factory, with Fang-
bong assisting him in handling political affairs and Ye--ping
helping him in conducting production work. Gua.n-shui acted
as the "appointed worker delegate" and had no definite man-
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agerial duty. Except for Liu-ping, all these three members
of the revolutionary leading group were in fact not regarded
as members of the formal managerial staff of the factory.
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SECTION SEVEN: MERGER AND SEPARATION WITH
THE FARM MACHINERY STATION: 1971-1972
The Merger
In the end of 1970, the CPC and OTT again planned
to merge the factory with another commune-run enterprise,
this time with the far: ma :hirer The reason the
CPC and OTT gave for this mercer was that both of the
enterprises were dealing with agricultural machinery. The
farm machinery station was responsible for the utilization
and maintenance of large tractors that belonged to the
commune level. It also had its own .plant for producing
fittings for these tractors. It was supposed that if the
station was merged with the factory, the latter would
manufacture the necessary fittings for the former and hence
the station could specialize in the usake and upkeep of the
tractors.
but to the leading cadres of the factory, the merger
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with the station was undesirable, for it would lead to
the obliteration of the factory as an individual enterpr-
ise. It would be turned into just one of the plants of
the station, its name would be deleted, and, worst of all,
its leading group would be subordinated to the leadership
of the station. Disregarding the objections from the fact-
ory, however, the merger was enforced in 1971.
Changes after the Merger and the Problems leading to
Separation
When these two enterprises were merged into one, they
moved from their original places to another locality. At
the new site, there were two blocks of factory buildings.
The front block was occupied by the farm machinery station,
and the rear block by its new plant-- the farm machinery
manufacturing and repairing plant. 14
During the period of merger, though the leading
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group of the plant was retained, its members had to be
subordinate to the head of the station. That meant that
as a whole the plant was led by the station, and the head
of the station had the final say in the decisions made in
the plant. Along with increases in work and worker in the
plant (See Table 2.2), the leading group of the plant
also expanded. Two more men were appointed as me rbers a One
was Qu-zhong ( 区忠 ), a benohwo.rker, and the other way
Jiang-shan ( 江山 ), a salesman Roth of then, were
Party members. Ou-zhong was in charge of the security and
militia in the plant. Jiang-shah had no special managerial
duty.
In addition to the expansion of the leading group,
there was also a slight change of status as far as Fang-hong
and Liu-ping were concerned. Liu-ping grow in senile as the
16
years went by, Fang-hang replaced r im in the handling of
political affairs within the plant and also acted as deputy
secretary of the Party branch in the station,reprsenting
the plant. Liu-ping, together with Ye-qing were in charge
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TABLE 2-2: HIPLOYEES TYPES OF WORK: BY NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT, 1960-78. (continued)
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TABLE 2.2: EMPLOYEFES' TYPES OF WORK: BY NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT, 1960-78. (continued)
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1971 Regular 112 2 1 16 1 temporary worker had be-
employee come a regular worker
5 temporary workers had left.Apprentices 1
Fang-hong had become one of
Worker- 13 1 14 the managerial staff
peasants 14 worker-peasants had been
taken onTemporary
workers
Sub-total 26 (5) 31
boy
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TABLE 2.2: EMPLOYEES' TYPES' TYPES OF WORK:BY NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT,1960-78.(continued)
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1971 Regular 112 2 161 1 temporary worker had be-
emuloyces come a regular worker
3 temporary workers had leftApprentice 1 1
Fang-hong had become one of1313Worker- 1 14 the managerial staff
peasants 14 worker-peasants had beer
taken onTemporary
workers
sub-total 26 (5) 31
TABLE 2.2: EMPLOYEES TYPES OF WORK: BY NATURE OF ENPLOYXENT, 1960-78. (continued)
TotalStaff
Nature Minor numberAdministrativProduc Sub-of Remarksstore- oftion Mana-Year totalSales- Cash- Officeemploy- Driver Coo house emplo-worker gerial boyman ierment
yees
1972 Regular
182 21 Liu-ping had become one of11 2
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the storehouse keepers.
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10 12 2 2 1 worker, 1 apprentice and17
employees
1 peasant-workers had left







Sub-total 37 (8) 45
















Nature numberMinorAdministrativeProduc- Sub-ofYear Store- of RemarksMana-tion





1975 Regular 1 11 2 28221 11 apprentices had become
employees
regular workers









12 122 1 2 29 1 temporary worker become a
employees
regular worker.
Apprentices 39 39 2 peasant-workers had left.
15 apprentices and 1 tempor-Worker-
13 1 14 ary worker had been re-
peasants
cruited.
Temporary 1 1 2
workers
Sub-total 74 (10) 84
1977 Regular 456 1 1 1 231 3 4 workers had become mana-
employees gerial
Staff: 3 were directors ofApprentices 28
28
workshops and 1 was a qua-Worker-
lity inspector.1 16peasants 1 peasant-worker had left,
Temporary more peasant-workers had
been taken on.workers 1 4
14 apprentice had become re-
Sub-total 77 (1o) gular workers, 3 new appren-93
tices had come.




TABLE 2.2: EMPLOYEES' TYPES OF WORK: BY NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT,1960-78. (continued)
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ment man ier boy
keeper yees
1977 (cont'd) a regular worker.
2 regular workers had left




37 6 1 1 1 1 4 51 2 more "in-store" temporary
workers had left
Apprentices 26 26 5 apprentices had beenre-
cruitedWorker-
penasants




1 cook and 1 regular worker
had left.
Sub-total 82 (16) 98
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of production.
In the year of merger, many problems turned up. As
the main function of the station was to plough up land for
the brigades, the jobs of the tractor drivers and other
workers-in the station were seasonal. During busy seasons,
these workers and tractor drivers had to go down to the
fields and their work was tough and intense, but after
these periods they had nothing to do and usually simply
chatted around and relaxed in the workshops. Their beh-
aviour in the workshops had a bad demonstrating effect on.
the corkers in the farm machinery manufacturing and repair-
ing plant. As for the leading cadres in the plant, they
were intentionally indulgent to their won workers. Because
their plant was under the leadership of the station head
and had not retained its own name as an independent factory,
they were no longer so motivated to care about its manage-
ment. Besides conniving at the laxity o the workers, they
also showed less initiative in finding extra tasks in Hui-
cheng for the plant.
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As a result, in 1971 the plant suffered a loss of
23,100.00. Since it was only a sub-unit of the station,
the burden of the loss actually fell on the station. At
last, in January 1972, the CPC and CHIT allowed the plant to
separate from the station, and once again it regained its
own identity.
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SECTION EIGHT: DEVE.LOPiKENT AFTER THE SEPARATION: 1973-1977
Immediately after the separation from the farm mach-
inery station, Liu-ping was formally replaced by Fang-bong,
the present general manager of the factory. Whenever Fang-
hong was asked about the development of the factory after the
separation from the station, his .first response was to tell
you in delight how much profit the factory had made since
then, and how far the station lagged behind. He recalled
the exact amount of each year's profit the factory had made
since he had become the general manager, and the figures
were in accord with the statistical records kept in the'OIT_-,
12, 700.00(1973) 19,000-00( 1974) 29.500.00 (1975)
45, 300.00( 1976) 55, 600.00( 1977) and 80,000.00
(1978). Obviously Fang-hong was taking the increasing
profits to illustrate the development of the factory. Yet
as the annual investment in the factory was not known, this
indication should not be taken without re. ervation. Never-
theless, there were other indicators showing that the fact-
ory actually had developed since 1973. Its technological
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capacity had been raised, and its workload had increased.
Its scope of services had extended and the types of deal-
ings it handled had become more diversified. Its size had
expanded and its work organization had become more struct-
ured. These developments had, to a great extent, shaped
the current situation of the factory.
Work Load, equipment, and Types of Dealings
As the agricultural production gradually developed
the demand for farm machinery in the local agricultural
sector had increased since 1973, Before that time, most of
the agricultural machinery manufactories in Hui-cheng Town
were state-owned and provincially administered. Their
production tasks were part of the state economic plan and
the finished products were seldom sold to the local communes
in the county. 17 From 1973 onwards, agricultural machinery
manufactories at county level were set up they mainly pro-
duced walking tractors and other light farm machines for the
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local communes.
Owing to the limited capacities of these county
level factories, some of the work load spilled over to the
commune-run machinery manufacturing and- repairing factories,
especially those near to the county site. Through the sub-
contracting system, the latter.processed parts and products
for the former. Sometimes these commune-run factories even
received planned tasks from the County Planning Commission
( Xian Ji Hua Wei Yuan Hui
县 计 划 委 员 会 ) .
As more agricultural machines because available to
meet the local demand, the degree of mechanization in the
local communes gradually was raised. Keeping pace with it,
the demand for repairs of agricultural machinery also grew.
As a result, the work load for the farm machinery manfact-
ories, both at county and commune levels, increased rapidly.
This trend also influenced the development of the Huan-cheng
farm machinery manufacturing and repairing factory, especi-
ally during the years 1973- 1977.
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Before 1973, the service of the factory was largely
confined to the repairs of agricultural machinery. Up to
1972, the factory only possessed five bench vises, one baby
bench drill, five engine lathes, one shaping machine and
one simple boring maching. In order to keep up with the
increasing work load in the agricultural machinery build-
ing industry, the factory began to acquire new machine tools
from 1973 onwards( as shown in Table 2.3). If the necess-
ary machine tools were available in the market channels and
were relatively cheap( as compared with the cost of home-
made ones), the factory would simply buy them. But if
they were scarce and their purchas quotas were difficult-to
get, the factory. had to make them in its own plant. Selected
skilled workers were sent to other well-established machinery
manufactoriesl8 at county level to learn the necessary tech-
niques. Not only were simple machine tools like bench vises
home-made, but other complicated machines, like the auto-
matic hobbing machine, universal milling rnaci-iines, heavy duty
lathe, engine lathe and drilling machines, were also manufa-
ctured by its own workers.
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TABLE 2.3: MAJOR EQUIPI MTT N YILY ACQUIRED IN MACHINE-TOOL
VTORKSITOP AND BENCHWORK WORKSHOP EACH YEAR
Year Benchwork workshop Machine-tool workshop
Bought Home-made Bought Home-made Prize
1959 1 radial ben-
engine
ch vise. (pro- lathe
duced by sta--c (C620)























1960 1 engine lathe 1 engine
(C618) (Produ- lathe







TABLE 2.3: MAJOR E NEWLY ACQUIRED IN MACHINE-TOOL
WORKSHOP AND BENCHNORK WORKSHOP EACH YEAR (Continued)
Machine--tool workshopBenehwork workshopYear









1 engine lathe1 bench1972 1 baby bench
vise (C618) (prod-drill (prod-






















TABLE 2.3: MAJOR EQUIPMRNT NEWLY ACQUIED IN MACHINE-TOOL
WORKSHOP AND BENCHWORK WORKSHOP EACH YEAR (Continued)
Year Benchwork workshop Machine-tool workshop
Bought Home-made Bought Home-made Frize
1974 1 simple dr- 1 baby shap- 2 engine
illing mach- ing machine lathes
ine (produced by (C615)
Chaovang St-
1 radial dr- reet North
i11ing mach- Machine Tool
ine Manufactur-
ing Cooper-













1976 1 bench 4 bench vis- 1 shaping 1 univer-
vise es machine sal mill-
ing mach-(B665) (pr-




at Panyu Co- lathes
unty, Guang- (two C615,
dong- Provin- one C618)
ce)
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TABLE2.3: MAJOR EQUIPMENT NEWLY ACQUIRED IN MACHINE-TOOL
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TABLE 2.3: MAJOR EQUIPMET NTLWLY ACQUIRED IN MACHINE-TOOL
WORKSHOP AND BENSCHWORK WORKSHOP EACH YEAR (Continued)
Specification:
C615, swing over bed 150mm
0618: swing over bed 180mm
C620: swing over bed 200mm
0625: swing over bed 250mm
Heavy duty lathe: swing over
bed 2000mm
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With these additional machines, the technological
capacity of the factory was increased and subsequently the
type of dealings the factory had were more diversified.
They could be grouped into four main categories. (See
Table 2.4)
A. Piecemeal Dealings
The characteristic of these dealings was that they
were piecemeal. Their channels were, in a sense, not
planned. That meant the customers had no administrative
obligation to have dealings with this factory. But at the
same time the allocation of these dealings was not entirely
based on a market mechanism, because their pricing was fixed
uniformly at the state prices.19 Some of the factors that
affected the network of these dealings were: the accessib-
ility of the factory, the Quality of its output, and also
the personal connection between the dealers.
The amount of money and also the quantity of items
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TABLE 2.4.: TYPES OF DEALINGS, SOURCES OF CUSTOMRS AND
FORMS OF OUTPUT OF THE FACTORY SINCE 1973.
Types of Dealing Sources of Customers Forms of outputs


















Subcontracting Mainly from Hui-cheng Parts, and pro-
Town ducts
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involved in each of these piecemeal dealings were usually
very small. The items of these dealings were mostly the
repair of farm machines, the seeling of fittings, and also
piecemeal orders for farm machines. The common types of
repairs handled in this factory were the fixing up of ele-
ctric generators, motors, walking tractors, diesel engines,
pumps, threshing machines, sprayers, and also grain drying
machines etc. As for fittings,the factory produced the
necessary fittings for the repairs, the spare fittings
for sale, and the specific kinds of fittings ordered by
the customers.
The customers of these dealings care from both the
collective and the private sectors:
(1) Collective Sector:
This sector can be further divided into three sub-
sectors: the Huan-cheng Commune, the other communes, and the
industrial enterprises in Hui-cheng Town.
a.Huan-cheng Commune
As far as the piecemeal dealings were concerned,
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the majority of customers came from the Huan-cheng
Commune.
From the agricultural sector: the production
brigades and the production teams of Huan-
cheng Commune:- most of the production bri-
gades had their machines repared, fittings
and machine tools made here. Except for 0i
( 沙 崗 )Bang (奇榜) Sna Gang and
San Lian ( 三 联 ) production brigades
which were closer to other machinery manufact--
uring20, the other twenty-six production bri-
gades of Huan-cheng Commune often came to
this factory to have their damaged machery
fixed up.21 As for the production teams, the
repairing services were basically provided by
the farm machinery multi-purpose stations at
the brigade level. But because of the low
technological capacity of these stations,
individual production teams still came to this
factory.
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(ii) From the industrial sector:- The enterprises
in Huan-cheng Commune also came here to re-
pair machine tools, buy or order the necess-
ary fittings. Most of these enterprises
were industrial enterprises at commune level.
Others were street factories owned by the
Huan-cheng Town, industrial enterprises at
production brigade level, agricultural ent-
erprises and other service units set up at
commune level.
b. Other Communes
Sometimes the production brigades and the




San Jiang Commune （ 三 江 公 社 ）（ 公 社 ）
Shuang Shui Commune and Ya Xi（ 双 水 公 社 ）
Commune （ 崖 西 公 社 ） also asked this fact-
ory to repair machines and produce fittings.
c. Industrial enterprises in Hui-cheng Town
As this factory was near the edge of Hui-cheng
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Town, its range of customers also extended into the
town. Some of the industrial enterprises there
came here to repair their machines, order or buy
fittings and machines.22 But these piecemeal deal-
ings only constituted a small portion of the total
transactions between the factory and these indust-
rial enterprises. Their main type of dealings was
subcontracting rather than piecemeal dealings.
(2) Private Sector:
This included all the private dealings with indivi-
duals who came from Huan-cheng Commune or Hui-cheng Town
Usually they went to the factory seeking welding and rep-
airing services.
Althoi,gh the functions of the factory in providing
the repair services and in producing the local farm machin-
ery had long been recognized by the state, as long as these
piecemeal dealings were not under the state economic plan,
the purchase quotas of the raw materials necessary for the
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production of the factory were not given accordingly by the
state. In principle, those commune-run enterprises which
did not have any "matching agency" (Dui Kou Ji Cou 对 口
机 构 ) to take care of their vocational work and raw
material supplies( like this factory )23, could buy their
necessary raw materials from the Goods and Material Dispen-
sation Company Wu Zi Gong Xin Si 物 资 供 銷
) which was an agency of the County Ministry of Com-
mune-run and Brigade-run Enterprises( Xian She Dui Ban Qi
县 社 对 农 企 业 管 理局) .Ye Quan Li Ju ). But
in practice, as far as this factory was concerned, the
amount of raw materials( mainly rolled steel) it could
buy from that company was only about 6 - 7% of the total
raw materials needed for the production tasks it got from
these piecemeal dealings. Moreover, some of key items,
such as adaptors and welding electrodes, were not sold for
cash, but on a barter basis. The factory had to use a cer-




The source of planned tasks assigned to this fact-
ory could be classified into two: either from the county
or from the home-commune.
(1) Planned tasks assigned by the County Planning Commiss-
ion-
The County Ministry of Agricultural Machine-Build-
ing Industry( MAMI) (Xian Nong Ji Ju), which was in
charge of the upkeep and repairings of agricultural
machinery, also studied the supply and demand of these
machines in each of the local communes. They gathered
information from the CPC of each commune and reported
the situation back to the County Planning Commission.
In view of the supply and demand of different types of
agricultural machines, the capacities of the existing
factories, and also the amount of raw materials avail-
able for the production, the County Planning Commiss-
ion determined the quantity and types of agricultural
machines to be made during the season. Along with the
production plan, the purchse quotas of these machines
were also given out to different communes.
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As far as the manufacture of agricultural
machinery was concerned, the MAMI was responsible for
carrying out the production plan. The producting tasks
were assigned specifically to different direct affli-
cated factories of the MAMI: the Xin Hui First Agri-
cultural Machinery Manufactory (Xin Hui None Ji Ye
Chuan 新 会 农 机 一 广 ), the Xin Hui
Second Agricultural Machinery IM-Manufactory( Sin Hui
Nong Ji Zhu Zao Chuan )y the新 会 农 机 二 广
Xin Hui Foundry( Sin Hui Zhu Zao Chuan
新 会 铸
造 广 ), the Xin Hui Electric Machinery Plant( Xin
Hui Dian Ji Chuan ). under
电 机 广
the adminsitrative supervis on of the MAMI, the Agri-
cultural Machine-Building Company( Nong Ji Gong Si
was set up to take care of the vo-农 机 公 司
cational work. If the capacities of these manufactories
could not manage all the production tasks given to them,
the County Planning Committee would there assign a cer-
tain portion of the tasks to the County Ministry of
Commune-run and Brigade-run Enterprises, which in turn
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distributed them to the local commune-run farm machin-
ery manufacturing and repairing factories.
Therefore,-sometimes (uaually once in every
two or three years) this Huan-cheng Farm Machinery
Manufacturing and Repairing Factory received short-
term planned tasks from the county. 24 In such cases,
raw materials were also provided. The quotas for
purchasing the necessary raw materials were given along
with the assignment of production plan. Within the
limit of its quotas the factory could buy the required
raw materials from the County Ministry of Goods and
县 物 资
Materials Dispensation( Xian Wu Zi Quan Li Ju
管 理 局
) at the unified state prices. The fin-
fished products were delivered to the IAMI and were
thus brought into the formal marketing channels, and
might be sold to other communes or counties.
But in some cases the finished products were
sold on the spot. Sometimes when a commune required
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farm machinery which could be manufactured by its own
farm machinery manufacturing and repairing factory,
the County Planning Commission might consider assign-
ing that specific production tasks to its factory. In
that case, the finished products would be sold directly
to the production brigades and teams of the home-
commune at state prices.
(2) Planned tasks assigned by the commune
Sometimes even though the communes had noti-
fied the MAI-iI that they were urgently in need of a
certain type of agricultural machines, the County
Planning Commission might not be able to give there the
purchase quotas to meet their demand. As a result,
the communes had to acquire the necessary machines in
their own ways. if the production. of such machines was
within the technological capacity of their own farm
machinery manufacturing and repairing factories, they
would consider making them by themselves. For example
in huan-cheng Commune, each year usually before or
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during the harvest, the CPC mobilized each product-
ion brigade to inquire of its production teams their
equipments for different types of farm machinery.
Basing on the lists gathered, this factory produced
the necessary farm machines. The production brigades
and the production teams would then come to the fact-
ory to buy the finished products. According to what
the general manager said, from 1973 to 1977, the fact-
ory had manufactured 1500 pedal threshers, 500 grain
drying machines, 900 motors, 500 mud crushers and 50
grinders for the commune through such arrangement. As
these tasks were arranged by the commune, not by the
county, the factory had to find the necessary raw
materials and other items for the production through
its own informal connections.
C. Subcontracting Dealings
Along with the yearly addition of new machine tools
ever since 1973, the factory had raised its technological
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capacity and precision level. The improvement of the tech-
nological standard enabled it to take up the relatively
more complicated production tasks that spilled over from
the factories in Hui-cheng Town. As mentioned before,
during the period 1973- 1976, most of the machinery man-
ufactories in Hui-cheng Town were having excessive product-
ion tasks. In order to accomplish the production plans
passed down from above, these factories diffused part of
their work load to the near-by factories. Both the pro-
ximity to the town and the improved technological capacity
gave this factory an advantageous position in competing for
these subcontracting dealings.
Similar to the case of piecemeal dealings, the ind-
ustrial enterprises in Hui-cheng Town could have subcont-
racting dealings with any factories which they found appro-
priate. These was no administrative control. But unlike
the piecemeal dealings, the production tasks involved in
these subcontracting dealings were in fact indirectly under
the state economic plan. This was because these production
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tasks were originally assigned to the industrial enterprises
by the Planning Committee, either at county level or at
provincial level. No matter at which factory the products
were completed, they would finally be brought into the
formal marketing channels of the state. Also unlike the
case in piecemeal dealings, both the number of the product-
ion tasks and the amount of money involved in the subcon-
tracting dealings were usually large, and they were made by
mass production rather than piecemeal production,
The subcontracting dealings had. constituted an
important portion of the total transactions of this factory
since 1973D The forms of output in these subcontracting
dealings could be classified into two:
(1) Processing parts-
In this form of subcontracting, the overloaded
industrial enterprise released Dart of its burden th-
rough diffusing it to certain links in the production
chain of the tasks to this factor,. Thus the parts of
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the products were processed here. For example in 1Q76
and 1977, the Civil Transport Machinery Manufactories
( Min Yun Ji Qi Chuang 民 运 机 器 厂 ) which
was an affilitated factory of the County Ministry of
Communication( Xian Jiao Tong j u 县 交 通 局 ）
asked this factory to process parts-- the gear wheels,
spline shafts, bent axles, and gear boxes etc.-- for
its products.
(2) Manufacturing finished products--
This form of subcontracting differed from the
above form in the sense that not just Parts of the'pro-
ducts were processed here, but the whole product was
manufactured here. The overloaded industrial enter-
prise simply gave a portion of its production tasks
directly to this factory. For example, in 1977, the
task of producing a batch of grouting machines was
assigned to the Hui-cheng Electric Appliance Manufact-
ory by its direct supervision unit-- the Provincial
Ministry of Water Conservancy grid Electrical Power.
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Yet the Hui-cheng Electric Applicance Manufactory later
found that it could not finish the jobs in time. So it
transferred a portion of the production tasks to this
factory.
Although these dealings were called subcontract-
ing in fact the two parties involved did not sign any
sort of contract. Their dealings were simply based on
oral agreement, or as the general manager of this fact-
ory said, based on trust. Trust, of course, could be
an important factor affecting the proceeding of the
dealing, yet it was not the only factor that these.
industrial enterprises at Hui-cheng could rely on.
Because in the long run, this factory was actually
depending on them, not only for their provisions of
tasks( through both subcontracting and piecemeal deal-
ings), but also for their supplies of raw materials and
set-ups.
The introduction of subcortrac tin, dealings had
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engendered the dependency of this factory on the ind-
ustrial enterprises in Hui-cheng Town, but at the same
time, it had to a large extent facilitated its expan-
sion. The customer network of the factory was extended,
the work load increased, and at the same time technolo-
gical capacity of the factory was raised and the output
was more diversified. New workers were recruited and
new equipment installed. In order to keep up with the
ever increasing output and profit targets set by the
CCI, the factory became more and more dependent on the
subcontracting dealings, and so amount of subcontracting
dealings it could obtain largely affected its further
development.
Work Organization.
As mentioned before, Liu-ping had been demoted from
the position of Revolutionary Leading Group leader since
1973. He remained in the factory but only acted as a store-
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house keeper. Gang-hong and Ye-qing were then formally
appointed by the OIT as the chief leader and deputy leader
of the Revolutionary Leading Group respectively. The ori-
ginal responsibilities of Liu-ping were then shared out
between the two of them. As the deputy leader, Ye-ging
was responsible for the daily assignment of tasks to ind-
ividual workers and also the instruction in technological
know-how. Fang-hong, the chief leader as well as the
secretary of the branch in the factory, was in charge of
the overall development, the policy implementation, arid
the political affairs of the factory.
Since 1972, the factory had greatly increased its
numbers of workers and staff. The total number of prod-
uction workers and apprentices had nearly tripled( in-
creased from 26 to 77) over the years 1971 to 1977. At
the same time, the number of staff( including managerial,
administrative, and also minor staff) also had tripled
( from 5 to 16) as shown in Table 2.2.25 In 1972, 1974,
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1975, 1976 and 1977 the factory had red
fifty three apprentices. Most of them
cheng townsmen who manages to stay in t
schooling.
26
As a result, the percenta
and staff ( at or under 25 years old )
raised from 56% in 1972 to 73% in 1977.
Along with the increase in the
and staff, the work organization of the
structured. In production, workers wer
to their types of work in different wor
five workshops: the machine tool worksh
workshop, the forge workshop, the elect
and also the workshop of the electricia
with specifications and set time-rates
ectly to individual workers by Ye-qing.
had finished the job, he had to record
on the specification slip. The number
saved would be summed up at the end of
on the notice board.
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In other activities, like group discussions in
workers' assembly and classes in technical night school,
workers were divided into four groups. All the smiths, that
is about two to three of them, were combined with the
twenty-odd benchworkers to form one group. The thirty-odd
machine tool operators were divided into two groups accord-
ing to their shifts.27 The other group was composed of ten
to eleven electricians and two to three elevtric welding
workers.28 For each group, two leaders( one chief and one
deputy) were appointed by the general manager. In princi-
ple, they were responsible for political guidance within the
group. The concrete jobs they usually had to take up were
to hold group discussions( if there were any) in the work-
ers' assemblies and in public appraisals. They were the re-
presentatives to assert their group's loyalty to the central
government during political movements in the workers' assem-
blies. Sometimes they also assisted the deputy manager in
making attendance checks and recording the workers' perfor-
mance.
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Read '11stment of La Level
In 973, there were directives from the central
government calling for the readjustment of wage levels in
all commune-run enterprises. As far as this farm machin-
ery manufacturing and repairing factory was concerned, this
wage readjustment program had two dimensions. First, the
old black ten grades wage scale was replaced by a new
scale which was set up by the Central Labour Managerment
Bureau
（ 中 央 劳 动 管 理 局 ） In the new wage scale, the
corres ondin_g monthly salaries for the first four labour
grades were $32.00, $37.00, $42.00 and. $47.00. The wages
of the apprentices were increased from $14.00, $16.00 an
$18.00 to $20.00, $22.00 and $26.00 in respect of the first,
second and third yrars of their apprenticeship. Although
there was a considerable increase in wages according to this
new scale, the wages of this commune-run factory were still
lower than those of the same industry run by the count-f.
Secondly, the upgrading conditions stated. in the government
document were modified so as to suit the srecial situation
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of this factory.
If the official upgrading conditions( See Appendix
I) had been applied to this factory strictly, no one
would have been eligible for upgrading at all. This was
because the workers and staff in this factory had high
grades, but their corresponding salaries were low. Even
those who had become regaular workers in 1958 their grades
were as high as 6. Yet the corresponding salary for grade
6 was only 45.00. Thus the CPC and OIT agreed to modify
the upgrading conditions (See Appendix II).
As a result of this decision, those like Fang-hong
(49.OC) and Chou-tim (51 .00), whose salaries were already
above 47.00, were not qualified for this wage readjustment.
Those who satisfied the above conditions, had to go through
the process of public appraisal. Seniority, though it was
the major criterion for the upgrading, was not the only
criterion. Other criteria were political participation,
work attitudes, and performance, as well as technological.
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First of all, every qualified worker and staff
member had to justify why he thought himself worth so high
a grade. The self-appraised results were written down on
a black board. Then, group discussions were carried out
with reference to the self-appraisal. All the members of
the factory( including those unqualified for this wage
readjustment) into groups based on their types of work:
the machine tool operators, the benchworkers( with smiths
appending to the group), the electricians( including the
electric welding workers) and the staff( both managerial
and minor staff). The chief leader of each group was res-
ponsible for holding the group discussion. The general
manager would use both the opinions reported by the group
leaders and his own judgement to arrive at a final decision
about the wage readjustment of each qualified worker and
staff member. if there was no public objection to the last
appraisal he made, the results would then be handed over to
the OIT for the final apc.roval.
As far as this wage readjustment program was concer-
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ned, it did not evok much controversy in the factory. One
of the reasons was that the main condition stated in govern-
mental documents for this wage upgrading was seniority, which
was a comparatively objective, clear, and measurable crit-
erion. Once a worker satisfied the condition, it was very
difficult to turn him down. Thus there was general agree-
ment among the workers, the general manager, and the OIT
that basically all qualified workers would be allowed to
have their wages upgraded according to the document 29 except
for those who had made serious mistakes 30 and would have
their upgrading delayed for one year. Moreover, as the work-
ers` salaries in this factory were relatively low, the OIT
purposely let most of the qualified .workers and staff have
an increase in wages in order to meet some of their deep-
seated grievances.
Managrement System
It was not until 1974 that the factory had formal
88
rules and regulations written in black and white. Before
1974, as the number of production workers and apprentices
in the factory was less than forty( See Table 2.4), the
management system was not so formalized. The work norms
were conveyed orally either in the workers' assemblies or
through personal supervision. In 1971+, as the size of the
factory expanded( the total number of workers and staff
was over sixty), formal rules and regulations were intro-
duced. The factory modified the double seven management
system( Shuang Qi Quan Li Zhi Du
双 七 管 理 制 度 )
advocated by the central government and set up its own
formal management system.
The "double seven management system" was composed
of two dimensions: the macro and the micro manas-ement di-
mensions. The macro management dimension was concerned
with the relationships between the enterprise and the state.
Its component parts were the "seven tragets" ( Qi Xiang
七项指标) computed by the state for theZhi Biao
implementation of the production plan in the enterprise.
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The "seven Targets" were output of major products; the
variety of the products the quantity of the products; cost
reduction; capital investment gross value of output; and
profits. The micro-management dimension dealt with the
relationships between the factory authority and the workers.
Concretely it was made up of "seven systems"(Qi Xiang Zhi
They were: the system of personal re-Du 七 项 制 度 ) .
sponsibility the system for ensuring safety in production
the checking system on the quality of work; the fire pre-
vention system; the time-rate and production quota system
the work attendance checking system and the system for keep-
ing of instruments.
As far as this factory was concerned, only the last
two targets of the macro-management dimension of the "doub-
le-seven management system" were applied. The output value
target as well as the profit target were set by the OIT and
passed down to the factory as the annual production plan.
Owing to the miscellaneous and unplarnned nature of the
tasks handled in the factoyr, the OTT only managed to
set these two targets for it. As there was no "matching
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agency to take care of its vocational work or to supply
it with the planned production tasks and raw materials, the
types and the amount of work it could get during the year
were difficult to anticipate. Hence, it was impractical
to set specific targets to hound the quality, quantity and
variety of products the factory was allowed to deal with.
As for the output value target and the prof its target,
their formulations were simply based on the performance of
the factory in the preceding year. Taking the actual amount
of output values and profits accomplished last year as the
bases, the OIT set the next year's targets 10o to 30% above
that level. Therefore in most cases, these two targets'
were ever increasing. is for the micro-management dimension,
all the new system were initiated except for the checking
system on the cuality of work.31 ( See Appendix. III)
The sets of new rules and regulations were formally
announced during the workers' assembly. In a way, the
structure of these rules and regulations was not compact
and the content not very rigorous. Superficially it seemed
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that the operation of these rules and regulations relied,
to certain extent, on the personal conscientiousness and
self-discipline of the workers. Some of the items( See
Appendix II: A(4) D(3) E(2) and also F(2)) were obvi-
ously based on the self-reporting method. Most of the
others were just work norms stating what one should do and
should not do. Moreover, these rules and regulations did
not indicate any immediate or distinct sanctions for violat-
ors. But no matter how rudimentary these rules and regulat-
ions were, they still could be viewed as a token of for-
malization in the management system of the factory.
Even though the rules and regulations were crudely
set out, this did not imply that the workers could take
advantage of the loopholes in them. There were other fact-
ors pertaining to the implementation of these rules and re-
gulations. First of all, the sanctions, though not stated
formally in black and white, were actually enforced in the
factory. For those who had violated the rules and were
known to the group leaders in the workshops, their misdeeds
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would be reported through the group leaders to Fang-bong.
Then during the weekly workers' assembly, Fang-hong would
announce the violators' names and criticize them in public.
In order to end up the matter, they had to admit their mis-
takes and promise not to commit them again, immediately
after Gang-hong's criticisms.
As most of the workers regarded public criticism
and confession as a share, such sanctions were in a way
effective in stopping them from breaking the rules. But
at the same time, this managerial style also caused tensions
between the workers and managerial staff.32
This was especially so for those who had been crit-
jcized. They inevitably developed adversion to Fang-hone
and the Group leaders. Since the grout leaders were ao-
ointed by Fang-hong, the workers saw them as his snoopers
and henchmen. Although the workers disliked Fand-hong' s man-
agerial style, they were reluctant to make their complaints
publicly Owing to the aolitical atmosphere during that per-
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iod, they seldom dared to show any resentment against the
policy, the situation, or the leaders of the factory overtly.
They said if they did, their grumbles and complaints might
be cited and they might be criticized as making cynical
说 怪 话 )
remarks"( Shuo Guai Hua about the Socialist
system. If they were lucky, their misdeeds might be simply
treated as contradictions among the people( Pen Min Nei
Bu Mao Dun
人 民 内 部 矛 盾 ) If not, they might be" cri-
ticized from the higher plane of principle and the two--line
struggle"( Shang Gang Shang Xian 上 綱 上 線 )
Their fears seemed to be not without reasons They
narrated a past event to back up-their assertions. They
recalled,
Three to four years ago, when the Social
Education Movement( Sheui Zhu Yi Jiao Yu
社 会 主 义 教 育 运 动
Yun Done
was
LaLuzuIleu, Lnree caares prom the county level
were sent to our factory and stayed here.
They were responsible to initiate the move-
ment and make on-the-spot investigations.
During that period, we had to do more vol-
untary labour after work. One day we were
told to clear the grass on the play of
the factory. One of our fellow worker.
li ( 寛 理 ) grumbled and said, " 'vol-
untary labour' actually means 'reform tiro--
ugh labour'(Yi Wu Lao Dong Qi Shi Ji Shi
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Lao Gai 义 务 劳 动 其 实 是 劳 改 )." His
words were picked ui by Liu-ping.
As a Party member, Liu-ping was very enth-
usiastic about the movement. He did not
point out Kuan-li's misdeeds or blame him
on the spot, but brought the matter out
during the Party Branch meeting( restri-
cted to Party members only), when he cri-
ticized Kuan-li from the higher plane of
principle and two-line struggle ( Shrug
Gand Shang Sian Pi 上 綱 上 線 批 ). Liu-
ping and Fang-hong were selfish. They
intended to make the factory well-known at
the expense of Kuan-li's future. They
wanted to take advantage of this chance to
the acute class struggle in the factory.
As for the cadres sent down from the county,
they also were pleased to view this as a
case of class struggle because it would
indicate the effectiveness and justify the
significance of the movement. As a result,
Kuan-li's case was regarded as one of 'con-
tradiction between the veoole and the enemy'
( Di Wo Mao Dun 敌 我 矛 盾 ) and he was
treated as one of thhe class enemies.
In the mass meeting Fang-hong said that
even the 'Di Fu Fan Huai You, (landlords,
rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad
elements, and rightists 地 富 反 环 右
did not dare to say such sarcastic words
before the people, but Kuan-li had had the
audacity to say them out for them. Kuan-
li admitted his fault, yet the leading cadres
kept on persecutin him.
in tube end, Kuan-li left the factor, left
Huan-cheng, and we don't know where he has
gone. He lost his place of living and he
could only work as a temporary worker since
then. worst of all, he has a wife and child-
ren who are dependinr on him. His situation-
must be miserable. He was unlucky. in fact,
such sarcastic words are nothing special to us.
Kuan-li, as a man over thirty, ought to have
known what could or could not be said. How-
ever, he really did make a serious mistake.
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At that time most of us felt that Fang-hong
had exaggerated the whole matter and it was
too much for Kuan-li. But we dared not say
a word on Kuan-li's behalf. There was no-
thing we could do."
It was very difficult to judge to what extent the
workers' description of this event was true, and whether or
not the leading cadres really had the intention they were
accused of. However, when Fang-hong was asked how he man-
aged the workers during that period, he frankly admitted
that the political movements launched at that time played
a significant role in preventing the workers violating the
rules and regulations. He said that, although in the per-
iod of the Gang of Four money incentives were not allowed,
there were other ways of keeping the workers in line. Dur-
ing that time, political movements were frequent and class
struggles were emphasized. Those who showed unwillingness
in submitting to the orders of the factory were the potent-
ial targets of criticism during the political movements.
As a result, workers seldom ventured to go against the
factory authority overtly. Thus, as compared with the pre-
96
sent situation, the workers were much more submissive and
easy to manage at that t inie.
Besides resorting to compulsion, incentives were
also given to some of the workers. Every month the work
performance of each worker was announced. Besides criti-
cizing those with poor performances, the ones with out-
standing performance would be praised in the workers'
assembly. For every half year, i,odel wor lers( Lao Flo
) were selected by the factory authority. They
劳 模
were rewarded not in money terms, but in the form of cert-
ificates of merit. As a model worker, the chance of being
admitted into the Communist Youth Leacue Branch or being
appointed as member of the leading group of the factory was
increased. This was one of the formal channels through
which one could get into the circle of the leadinJ cadres.
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Other Organizational Activities in the Factory
A. Communist Youth League Branch( CYLB) (Gong sing Tuan
Zhi Bu 共 青 团 支 部 ）
As among the young workers recruited there were mem-
bers of the Communist Youth League( CYL), a Communist
Youth League Branch( CYLB) had been set up in the factory
since 1973. Although the CYLB was directly led by the CYL
at the commune level, its secretary was appointed by the
factory leader, Fang-hong. At the beginning, the CYLB had
only 4 members. In the next year, the number increased-to
7, and in 1977 there were altogether 9 members. All of them
were male workers except one, Si-lian, who joined the CYLB
in 1974.
In principle, the members of the CYLB were advanced
workers who were ready and willing to be the helping hands
of the Party. Besides submitting to the calls of the CYL
at commune level, they also had the obligation to assist the
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factory authority in the handling of political and ind-
ustrial affairs. As far as the factory was concerned, the
duties of the CYLB were: to take the lead in political
movement to take up technical innovation tasks to organize
recreational activities and also to organize workers to
do voluntary work.
党 支 部 ）B. Communist Party Branch( CPB)( Dang Zhi Bu
Up to 1977, there were altogether five Party member
in the factory. They were Liu-ping, Fang-hong, Jiang-shan,
Ou-zhong, and Kuo-tian. Their years of admission to the
Party were respectively 1960, 1959, 1958 and 1977. Except
for Kuo-tian, a worker-peasant who joined the factory only
recently in April 1977, the other four had long been here 64
and were holding or had once held managerial positions in the
factory. Liu-ping was the former head and Fang-hong the
present head of the factory. As for Jiang-shan and Ou-shong,
they were members of the factory's Revolutionary Leading
Group..
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Although four out of five of the Party member poss-
essed managerial power in the factory, the internal organ-
ization of this CPB was not well-established. As there was
only five Party members, the CPB did not formulate any
branch committee( Dang Zhi Wei), and only Fang-hong was
formally named as the party branch secretary. They held
Party branch meetings only on special occasions. Usually
when the directors of the OIT( all of whom were Party
members) called for an internal conference to discuss the
current developmental policies and political issues of this
factory, Fang-hong would represent the CPB to participate in
the meeting. Before or after the conference, he might con-
vene a CPB meeting.
C. Technical Night School
During 1973- 1976, all workers and apprentices had
to attend the technical lectures organized by the factory
every Friday night. Three of the experienced technical
workers were selected and they acted as instructors in each
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of the three classes: the benchwork class, the electric
engineering class, and the machine tool operation class.
All the smiths went with the bench workers to
attend the first class. The electric welding workers and the
electricians attended the second class, and all the machine
tool operation classes. All the smiths went with the bench
workers to attend the first class. The electric welding
workers and the electricians attended the second class, and
all the machine tool operators went to the third class. The
managerial and minor staff could join in any of the classes
they preferred. As participation was compulsory, attendance
was kept. Those who were absent without sufficient reason
would be criticized during the weekly workers' assembly.
Since the educational standards of the workers and
apprentices varied from lower primary school to higher sec-
ondary school, the instructors found it difficult to design
the lectures to suit all. In 1976, the factory authority
decided to make the technical night school optional for the
workers and only the apprentices were compelled to attend
101
the classes. As the attendance rates were low during 1977
and 1978, the factory authority finally abolished the whole
system in March 1979.
D. Workers' Assembly
Every Monday night, a workers' assembly was convened
by the factory leader, Fang-hong. All workers had to gather
in the common room at 7.30 p.m. and roll-call was then taken.
During the first part of the assembly, Fang-hong normally
read out all the official documents passed down from the
county and commune. In general, the documents concerned
the current political movement, the recent developmental
trends and policies, the calls from the central government,
and also the advanced experiences of the recognized models.
During the second part of the assembly, Fang-hong usually
announced the current production situation of each workshop
and criticized those who had violated the rules and regul-
ations. If it was the first week of the month, he also
gave his comments on the workers who had made extraordinary
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good or bad performances during last month. Group dis-
cussion was not usual, except for special occasions like
the public appraisal of wage levels or other political
meetings.
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NOTES ON CHAPTER TWO
1. As there is no written record concerning the key develop-
mental events of the factory, this delineation is mainly
based on the recall of the general manager, the deputy
manager, the old workers who are still in the factory,
and also the ex-deputy manager who had retired in 1976.
2. In the spring of 1958, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
put forward the general line of "going all-out, and
achieving greater, faster, better and more economical
results in buildin socialism" (Duo Kuai Hao Shenip: Di
J ian She She Hui Zhu Yi
Under the guidance of this general line, the slogans
Development of industry by the whole Party and the
whole people (Quan Dang Quan Min Ban Gong
刄 工 业
) and "Making steel by the whole people" (Quan
Min Lian Gang f were put forth. In the communes,
mass movements of making iron and steel and setting up
miniature industries were launched, with the aim to catch
up with and surpass the industries of Britain within
fifteen years. See People's Daily May 27, 1958.
3. The wooden farm tool cooperative was composed of the hand-
icraftsmen who had worked in Hui-cheng before the co-
operative movement (1955-60). It was collectively owned
by the handicraftsmen and directly under the supervision of
the County Handicraftsmen and Industry Unified Cooperative
(Xian Shou Gon Gve Lian She which was an
agency of the Handicrafts Industry Administration General
Office. In 1959, the county authority transferred it to a
lower administrative level and hence, though in vocation
work it was still under the leadership of the unified
多 快 好 有 地 建 设 社 会 主 义
全 党 全 民
全 民 錬 鋼 )
县 手 工 业 联 社 ) ,
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cooperative, administratively it was under the directive
of Wan-cheng Commune. This was the reason why in 1960 the
CPC and OIT could have the authority to merge it with the
farm machinery and repair factory.
4. In 1960, the county authority decided to transfer some
of the technical workers in the state-owned factories
to the commune-run enterprises, so as to increase the
technical competence of the latter. They were paid
according to the wage system of state enterprises and
still kept their domiciles at in the towns (e.g. Hui-
cheng, or Jiang Men
5. In the spring of 1960, CPC called for the four trans-
formations campaign in the commune--- i.e. mechanization
(in farming). electrification (in rur, villages), water
conservancy (in irrigation and drainage), and scientific
research (in fertilizer improvement)--- among which
mechanization was the focus of the program. This was one
of the reasons why, until the second half of 1960, the
factory still had sufficient repairing and production
tasks for the large number of workers.
6. The wooden farm tools cooperative remained behind. This
event virtually allowed each of the enterprises to retain
its own identity, not only informally in actual practice
but also formally in name.
7. This was the informal name they gave to the cooperative.
8. A worker worked for eight hours a dav and 25.5 days a month.
Hence every month he had to work for 204 hours. If his
basic monthly salary was u28.00, his hourly salary would
江 门 ）
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be YO-137. Based on this rate, the number of hours he
saved would be converted into money terms.
9. The wage system of the palm-leaf industry at commune level
was determined by the*Handicrafts Industry General Admin-
istrative Office for the vocational work of the former
was guided by the latter.
10. When the workers mentioned the period of Cultural Revolu.
tion, they usually refered to the years from 1967 to 1969.
So here I take these few years as the period of Cultural
Revolution, rather than extend the period till the official
closure of the Cultural Revolution in 1977.
11. When asked about the situation of the factory during the
Cultural Revolution, the leading cadres and the old
workers were not too willing to tell. Only very general
answers were given. As I did not want to press for ans ze,'5,
the information concerning this period was limited and
should be taken. with reservation.
12. The three loyalties" means: loyalty to Chairman Mao, to
Mao Tse-tung's thought, and the Chairman Mao's proletarian
revolutionary line.
13. This was exactly the word the workers used to describe
their daily routine: take an oath in the morning and
make a report in the eveni (Zao Xuan Shi, Wan Hui Bae
早 宣 誓 晚 汇 报
14. During the period of merger, the farm machinery manufact-
uring and repairing factory became one of the plants of
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the farm machinery station and no longer retained its
name. So in this section I call it the "farm machinery
manufacturing and repairing plant".
15. Jiang-shan was the former deputy manager of the paper
mill --- one of the commune-run industrial enterprise.
He entered the factory in 1971. Ou-thong was a demobi-
lized soldier. He'entered the commune steelworks in
August 1958. Due to the merger of the commune steelworks
with the farm machinery manufacturing and repairing
factory 1959, he became a worker of the latter. Until
1962 when the factory was closing down, he found another
job in the supply and marketing cooperative at Wan-cheng
Commune. Later in 1971. he went back to this farm
machinery manufacturing and repairing plant again.
16. Liu-ping was born in May 1912. At that time he was about
fifty-nine years old.
17. The marketing of machinery was under the national plan.
In most cases, quotas and money were the prerequisities
for buying machine tools.
18. As far as industrial training was concerned, this factory
usually sent workers to Xin Hui Agricultural Machinery
Manufactory (Xin Hui Nong Xie Chang
the Second Agricultural Machine Tools Manufactory of Xin
Hui (Xin Hui Nong Ji Er Chang ), and
also the Hui-cheng Wachine Tool Repairing factory (Hui
Cheng Li Xiu Uhang, ). They offered会 城 机 修 厂
free training services to the workers mainly because
Fang-hong, the Feneral manager of this factory, had
good relationships with their managers. Besides, they
had other dealings.
新 会 农 械 厂
新 会 农 机 二 厂
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19. Not only the prices of the fittings and products were
based on the unified state prices, even the charges of
work hours spent in the repairings were also in accordance
with the state prices.
20. As Qi Bang and Sha Gang production brigades were near
to Jiang Men city and San Lian production（ 江 门 市 ）
（ 大 泽 公 社 ）brigade was near Da Ze Commune , they
usually had dealings with the machinery manufactories
there rather than with this factory
21. This was further indicated by the fact that each of
twenty-six production brigades had its own pigeon-hole
in this factory. In the office of the factory there was
a rack on the wall over the table of the cashier. The
rack was made up of six columns and each of the columns
was divided into-tn pigeon-holes. These pigeon-holes
were used to store up the bills of dealings. Each unit
which had frequent dealings with the factory, was given
a fixed pigeon-hole by the cashier. The twenty-six
nrouction brigrades of Huan-cheng Commune which had
pigeon-holes in the rack were: Cheng Nan （ 城 南 ） , Mei
Jiang （ 梅 江 ） , Tian Lu （ 天 禄 ） , Jiang Ju （ 江 咀 ） ，
Dong Jia （ 东 甲 ） Ning Zhen （ 灵 镇 ） , Cha Keng （ 茶
坑 ） , Qun Sheng （ 群 胜 ） , Du Hui （ 都 会 ） , Jiu Long
（ 九 龙 ） , Ma Chong （ 孖 冲 ） ， , Tian Ma Er Cun （ 天 马 二
村 ), Tian Ma San Cun （ 天 马 三 村 ） , Tian Ma Si Cun
（ 天 马 四 村 ） , Tian Ma Wu Cun （ 天 马 五 村 ） , Tian Ma
Liu Cun （ 天 马 六 村 ） , Tian Ma Qi Cun （ 天 马 七 村 ） ，
Xi Cheng （ 西 盛 ） , Da Dong （ 大 洞 ） , Da Jiao （ 大 滘 ） ，
Si Ya （ 泗 丫 ） , Cheng Jiao （ 城 郊 ） , He Bei （ 河 北 ） ，
Er Ning （ 二 宁 ） , Nang Eng
（ 南 庚 ） ，
Xi Jia
（ 西 甲 ) 。
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22. The piecemeal machine products ordered by these industrial
enterprises were usually for their own use. That meant
these finished products were not for re-sale. When the
industrial enterprises urgently needed certain equipment
yet could not acquire it immediately through the formal
marketing channels, they would ask the machinery manuf-
actories which they had good relationships to make it for
them. They described such ad hoc orders a6 the "Tu Ji"
literally, make a concentrated effort to finish( 突 出
a job quickly). For example, in 1976, the kin nui iii uro--
genous Fertilizer Manufactory asked the factory to make
several types of machine tools for its own use: a gas
engine. pumps and also a mud crusher.
23. Administratively all the commune-run industrial enterprises
were under the supervision of the OIT of the commune.
Yet vocationally some of these enterprises had their own
matching agencies to take care of their production
tasks, vocational training and the supply of raw materials.
For example, in Huan-cheng Commune, among its eleven
industrial enterprises, seven had such agencies. They were
the paper mill, the construction team, the food and oil
processing factory, the transportation team, the farm
machinery station, the palm-leaf fans manufactory and
also the palm leaves sun-drying field. Their matching
agencies were correspondingly the Provinvial Sugar and
Paper Processing Company (Sheng Tang Zhi Gong Si 省 糖 紙
公 司 ) the County Ministry of Construction and Building
the County Ministry of(Xian Ji Jian Ju 县基建局
the County MinistryFood (Xian Liand Shi Ju 县粮食局)
of Communications and Transportation (Xian Uiao Tong Yun
the County Ministry of agriculturalShu Ju 县 交 通 运 输 局 )
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Machine-Building Industry (Xian Nong Ji Ju. 县 农 机 局
and also the County Palm-leaf Industry Comapny (Xian
Kui Ye Gong Si. Those which did not have
any matching agency had to find their own jobs and raw
materials through their own informal networks.
24. For example, in the summer of 1975 this factory was
assigned the task of producing 1,000 grain drying
machines. The task had to be finished within one month.
The County Planning Commission determined to produce a
very large number of grain drying machines shortly after
the observatory had forcast that the weather would be
persistently wet during harvest time that year. As the
decision was made suddenly and the task load was heavy,
part of the production task was formally assigned to the
farm machinery manufacturing and repairing factories at
commune level.
25. Despite of the fact that the revolutionary leading
group" which was composed of four personas was set up
in 1969, only the leader (i.e. the general manager),
Liu-ping, was formally recognized as the managerial staff
throughout the years 1962 to 1970. In 1971, when Fang-
hong replaced him in the handling of political affairs,
both he and Fang-hong were regarded as managerial staff.
in 1972, when Liu-ping became the store-house keeper, Fang-
hong as well as Ye-ping were formally announced to be
the general manager and deputy manager of the factory
respectively. They became the formal managerial staff
of the factory. This situation lasted until 1977 when
four more workers were promoted and were regarded as
managerial staff: three of them were the directors of
the workshop and one was the quality inspector of the
县 葵 业 公 ）
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machine tool workshop. But that did not mean that all
these workers were members of the "Factory Managerial
Committee" (Chuan Quan Li Wei Yuan Hui
The details concerning the Factory Managerial Committee
will be discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.
26. Since the Cultural Revolution, it was the Government's
policy to transfer town youths who had reached 17 years
old-and were without permanent jobs (usually fresh
graduates from the higher or lower forms in secondary
schools) to work as peasants in the production teams.
In practice, each family was allowed to have one son/
daughter remain at home. They were the so-called "town-
畄 城 青 年).stay youths" (Liu Cheng Qing Nian ). As their
domiciles were in town, they could become regular workers
like their narent. But the domiciles of those who had
to "go to the countryside" (Xia Xiang ) were
下 乡
transferred to the "countryside" production teams and
hence their chances of becoming industrial workers were
very limited. Unless they could either get into univer-
sities or post-secondary institutions, or replace their
fathers' positions when their fathers retired, they had
to remian in villages with no definite date of return.
Of course, there were exceptions who managed to stay
or to transferred back to town through informal connections.
This will also be discussed in a later chapter.
27. Only the machine tool workshop had day and night shifts.
This arrangement had been.started in 1973. Its purpose was
to fully utilize the very few machine tools that owned
by the factory.
23. There was no record taking down the exact number of workers
工 管 理 委 员 会) .
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in different workshops throughout years. The numbers
indicated here were only estimations made by the general
manager about the average number of workers in each
workshop from 1974 to 1976.
29. They named that situation as sit according to the seat
number (Dui Hao Ru Zuo
30. When asked about what sort of mistakes they considered
as serious, they gave examples like breaking the law,
stealing things from the factory, having love affairs
during the period of apprenticeship (it was by factory
regulations that all apprentices should not have love
affairs during their three years of apprenticeship),
and being so careless in work as to cause other workers
to suffer industrial injury.
31. The checking system on the quality o f work was not intro-
duced until 1977 when there were complaints not only
from the production brigades about the duration of
production but also from the industrial enterprises in
Hui-cheng Town about the precision of the parts made in
the factory. As a result, a female apprentice who was
originally a blueprint drawer in machine tool production,
was transferred to the job of quality inspector.
32. Although the principal roles of the group leaders were
as production workers and they were not regarded by the
factory authority as members of the managerial staff, I
use the word managerial staff to describe them becau:e
the tensions between them and the workers were generated
from their partial roles as foremen in the workshop. Also,
I would like to point out that the information in the
following paragraphs was given by the workers, not the
leading cadres.
對 號 入 座 ） 。
CHAPTER Tom: CURPIi SITUATION OF THE FACTORY
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SECTION ONE: GENERAL SITUATION
The historical development of the factory during
1958- 1972 could be regarded as the pre-mature and unstable
phrase of the factory. In that period, due to the zig-zag
of the policies, and the low profit rate of the factory,
it had merged with other enterprises for several times,
and had even once been abandoned by the commune. At that
time the size of the factory was constantly small (less
than 50 employees), and the equipment it installed were
simple. After 1973, along with the development of the
agricultural machinery industry, it had gradually expanded
its business network, diversified its' output, and become
more and more dependent on the subcontracting dealings from
county level enterprises at Hui-Cheng Town. The number of
its workers steadily increased and its work organization
eventually became more structured, and the formal management
system became more formalized. Beyond the formal management
system, the genera1 manager had availed of the coercive
exhortation of the political movements to compell the workers
114
to keep the rules and regulations. In general, the workers
were submissive to the orders and work disciplines, and
dared not to oppose the general manager in open. As there
was no formal channel for the workers to express their
feelings and complaints about the factory and the managerial
style of the general manager, their grievances were accumul-
ated and augmented.
After the fall of the Gang of Four, the policies of
the Party and the central government had changed drastically.
Some of the policy-changes on political, economic and manager-
ial dimensions had great influences on the current situation
of the factory.
On the Political Dimension
On July 7, 1978, at the national conference on
finance and commerce, Premier Hua Kou-feng stated that at
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present, it was a period of open speech about the social pro-
blems like rampant corruption, embezzlement, abuses of
power, false reports, gaining illegal favours, going through
the back door etc., (China News Analysis, No. 1136). Also,
in the Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued
on December 22, 1978, on behalf of the Political Bureau of
the Central Committee, he formally announced that it was
an appropriate time to close the large-scale nationwide
political movement and to shift the emphasis of the Party's
work and the attention of the people to socialist moderniz-
ation. (Peking Review, No. 52, 1978).
As far as this factory was concerned, since the
political. atmosphere was relatively tranquil and people
were more free to express their own sentiments and ideas,
the accumulated and long conceded discontents of the workers
on the general manager and-the factory were revealed. Dur-
ing the field visit, many of the young workers were willing
to tell me their feelings, and even their grievances aboua
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the general manager, the directors of workshops, and the
factory.
On the Economic Dimension
Also at the December 1978 the Third Plenary Session
of the Central Committee of the Party, it was formally
announced the decision on the reconstruction of the domestic
economic structure. But as far as the industry this factory
belonged-- farm machinery building industry-- was concern-
ed, dated back to the summation report of Yu Qui-li (the.
Minister in Charge of the State Planning Commission) on the
agruicultural mechanization published in January 1978, its
readjustment plan had already been advocated. (Daily Report,
Vol. 1, No. 21) The readjustment of the farm machinery ind-
ustry involved the standardization, serialization, and gener-
alization of farm machinery. Many of the inefficient farm
machine manufactories and farm machine repair and manufactur-
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ing plants at county level had to close down, merged, or
change over to other kinds of production. Only those fact-
ories with formal permits issued by the Farm Machinery
Standardization Committee at the central or provincial
level were allowed to continue their original types of
production. Especially for the productions of the three
types of farm machines-- tractor, hand-guided tractor, and
diesel engine-- were among the first to bear the brunt. It
was further planned that 46.2% of the tractor plants in
the whole country would be cut down (Beijung Review, No. 5,
1980). As a whole, in the current plan of the agricultural
modernization, priority had been given to the application of
modern science and high quality of chemical fertilizer inCDP
agriculture, instead of the promotion of mechanization so
long as the urban employment could not absorbed the labour
force it spared. (Daily Report, Vol 1, No. 11)
Such depressed situation in the farm machine building
industry had also led to the deficient in tasks of this
factory. Firstly there was no task assigned from the County
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Planning Committee. Secondly, as many of the factories at
Hui-cheng Town did not received any orders from the planning
committee at county or provincial level, the subcontracting
dealings which this factory had long been relied on were
sharply decreased. Thirdly, many of the production brigades
in Huan-cheng Commune no longer came to this Huan-cheng com-
mune-run factory, but went to the farm machinery repair and
manufacturing factories in the Hui-cheng Town to buy their
fittings and have their farm machines repaired. As the latt-
er were better equipped than the former, the quality of
services offered from the latter were higher than that of
former. So far as the prices were uniformly state prices,
and the latter were now having spare time to handly these
piecemeal dealings from the brigades, the latter took away
part of the business of the former.
Consequently, this factory had suffered from loss
since December 1978. From January to May 1979, the amount
of deficit was- 6400.00. As the amount of subcontracting
dealings decreased sharply, only about 50161 of the machines
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in the machine tool workshop were in operation during these
months. Many of the machine-tool operators, especially the
lathe operations, had no job to do. Yet the factory still
had to pay them because it had no power to discharge them so
far if they had not committed any serious mistakes. As a
result, in the early 1979, the factory had formally announced
that it would sign formal leave-permits for those workers
who wanted to leave. Besides, on the one hand the factory
requested the OIT to transfer the labour grade I workers
(those had just been transformed as regular workers) and the
apprentices to other commune-run enterprises, and on the
other hand, it did not permit any apprentice to change to
regular worker in the near future. It wanted to keep only
the technical workers (usually those of labour grade II and
above) and to release those at grade I or below (i.e. the
apprentices). But usually the one who managed to find jobs
in other better factories were those technical workers who
had connections. As for the transference to other corr.-rune-
run enterprises, most of the workers were not willing be-
cause the working conditions of these enterprises (especially
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the agricultural enterprises) were even worser than this
one. The sudden readjustment of the farm machinery industry
had made the prospects of this factory more gloomy. The
transference of job of the workers had led to direct con-
flicts between the factory and the workers.
On Managerial Dimension
Since 1978, the money incentive system had been
prevalently resumed in the economic organization throughout
China. Piece-rate wages and bonus system were tried out.
Officially it was stated that the system of piece-rate
wages and bonuses supplementing the fixed wages helped to
implement in a better way the socialist principle of to
each according to his work and more pay for more work.
Also, greater autonomy was given to the enterprises so that
they could make their own decisions on the production manag-
ement and on the formulation of regulations concerning re-
wards and penalties within the enterprises.
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As far as this factory was concerned, money incen-
tive system was introduced in early 1978. In 1978, the
Exceed Profit Award System was practised. Bonuses were
issued by season from the OIT to the factory as a whole.
The bonuses were then distributed among all the employees
according to their work performances. In 1979, this award
system was replaced by two different systems-- the Profit
Percentage Award System which was for the staff and the Mul-
tiple Items Award System which was basically a time-rate
reward system designed for the production workers. This
change was mainly due to the factory had been suffered from
loss since December 1978. These two award systems were
introduced with the hope that the initiatives of both the
staff and workers would be mobilized in a more appropriate
was so that the factory could turn losses into gains. But
so far as the factory got insufficient tasks, it was diff-
icult for it to make profits. Hence, for the first six
months of 1979, all the staff had no bonuses, and they felt
relatively deprived as compare to the staff in other enter-
prises and also to the workers in their own factory. More-
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as the production in the factory was composed of miscell-
anous work types, and for each work types, the supply of
tasks were unbalanced during the recent months, the chances
for the workers of different work types in gaining bonuses
were unequal. This had given rise to the frequent changes of
the contents and enumerative methods in the Multiple Items
Award System. The workers of different work types had
different responses to the award system. But in general,
they thought the bonuses were difficult to get and they
were confused by the everchanging of the enumeration in the
award system.
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SECTION TWO: COMPOSITION OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE FACTORY
In July 1979, the total number of employees in the
factory was 81,This was 17 less than the 1978 record
because 17 male employees had left within the first six
months of 1979. Among them, it was known that 2 retired
(Liu-ping and one benchwork), 3 left China for Macau (1
lathe operator, 1 milling machine operator and 1 benchwork-
er), and 5 were transferred to the enterprises at Hui-cheng
Town (2 electricians, 2 lathe operators, 1 planer).2
Work Types
According to the different types of work,-.-the employ-
ees of the factor could be classified into two broad cate-
gories: the staff and the production workers.
A. Staff
The group of staff comprised 6 managerial staff
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(1 general manager, 1 deputy manager, 3 directors of the
workshop, 1 quality inspector), 3 administrative staff (1
salesman, 1 cashier, 1 office boy), and 6 minor staff (1
driver, 2 cooks, 3 storehouse keepers). These 15 staff
constituted 18.5% of the total number of employees of the
factory. (See Table 3.1)
B. Production Workers
There were altogether 66 production workers, who
constituting 81.5% of the total number of employees in the
factory (Also see Table 3.1). Among these 66 production
workers, the majority (53.0%) were machine tool operators.
The second largest group (25.8%) was the benchworkers. The
others were the electricians (10.6%), the electric welding
workers (4.5%), the smiths (4.5%), and finally the carpen-
ter (1.5%).
For full utilization of the machines, the 35 machine
tool operators were subdivided into 2 groups. The number of
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workers in Group I and Group II were respectively 13 and 22.
They worked in shifts. In detail, the machine tool operators
could be further classified according to the type of machin-
es they operated. As far as this factory was concerned,
there were 24 lathe operators, 5 planers, 3 boring machine
operators, 2 hobbing machine operators, and 1 milling mach-
ine operator.
In production, these 6 types of production workers
(machine tool operator, benchworker, smith, electrician,
electric welding worker, and carpenter) worked in 6 diff-
erent workshops, at different physical locations. (See
Diagram 3.1) In administration, the machine tool operators
were grouped according to their shifts: machine tool work
Groups I and II. Each group had its own director. There-
fore, there were 2 directors in this workshop. As the
smiths, the electric welding workers, and the carpenter only
constituted very small groups, they had no directors in
their own workshops. Administratively they were appended
to the group of benchworkers. That meant that in activities
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other than production (e.g. group discussions), they were
usually grouped together. For the 3 smiths, their daily
tasks were distributed by the director of the benchwork
workshop. As for the 7 electricians, both-administratively
and for work purposes they were treated as a single group.
Their tasks were assigned by the deputy manager as group
tasks. Since they did not practise any formal assignment
of tasks within the group, they also did not have any dir-
ector in their workshop.
Basic Social Characteristics
Four basic sociological variables, sex, age, marital
status, and educational level are employed here to analyse
the general social characteristics of the employees in this
factory.
A. Sex
In this factory, male employees were in the majority
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(79%) (See Table 3.2). Only 17 out of the 81 workers were
female. Among the female employees, 3 (17.6%) were staff
(1 quality inspector, 1 cook, 1 storehouse keeper) and the
others were production workers(7 machine tool operators,
1 benchworker, 4 electricians and 2 electric welding workers).
(See Table 3.3) Of the 64 male employees, 12(18.8%) of
them were staff (1 general manager, 1 deputy manager, 3
directors of workshops, 1 cashier, 1 salesman, 1 office
boy, 1 driver, 2 cooks, and 2 storehouse keeper) and the
others were production workers(28 machine tool operators,
16 benchworkers, 3 smiths, 3 electricians, 1 electric
welding worker, and 1 carpenter).
Although the percentage of staff workers among both
the female and male employees, were approximately the same
(17.6° vs 1.8.8%), the mode of specific work type for the
male staff was at the managerial staff level(7.8%), while
that for the female staff was only in the category of minor
staff(11.8%). Considering the production group alone,
the modal numbers of both the male and female workers were
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( % ) ( % )
Managerial staff 7.8 5.9
Administrative staff 4.7 0.0
Minor staff 6 11.8




Electric Welding worker 1.6 11.8
Carpenter 1.6 0.0
Total (N) (64) (17)
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in machine tool work( 43.8% and 41.2%) and the percentages
were also very close. But the second commonest types of
work were different. For the male workers, it was bench-
work( 25.0%), and for the female workers, it was electri-
cal work( 23.5%).
B. Age
On the whole, most of the employees( 77.8%) were
below 31 years old,the mode( 45.7%) being the age group
21 to 25.( See Table 3.4) The mean age for all the
employees was 26.54. If considering production workers
and staff separately, the mean age for each group was 25.05
and 33.13 respectively thus the staff were usually older
than the production workers.
C. Marital Stuatus
The older age of the staff group, was linked with
the high percentage( 73.3%) of married employees among
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Total (N) ( 81)
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them. For the 81 employees only 23( 28.4%) of them
were married (See Table 3.5 ),and 11 out of these 23 (47,8%)
married employees were staff( See Table 3.6). As for the
production workers, only 12( 18.75%) of them were married
( 3 machine tool operators, 7 benchworkers, 1 electric
welding worker, 1 carpenter). The majority( 55.2°) of
single employee were machine tool operatorss, actually 32
out of 35( 91.4%) machine tool operators were single. The
mean age for the married employees was 37.3 and for the
single employees, it was 22.3.
D. Educational Level
As far as the educational level was concerned, 56.8%
of the employee had at least finished lower secondary
school. The majority( 74.0%) of the employees were of
higher primary( 33.3%) or lower secondary school( 40.7%)
educational level( See Table 3.7) For the 6 managerial
staff, 3( the general manager, the deputy manager, and also
the director of benchwork workshop) had only finished higher
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TABLE3.6: MARITAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEES IN THE FACTORY,








Administrative staff 13.0 0.0
Minor staff 17.4 3.4





Electric welding worker 4.3 3.4
Carpenter 4.3 0.0
Total (N) (23) (58)
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Lower primary school 8.6
Higher primary school 33 .3
Lower secondary school 40.7
Higher secondary school 16.1




primary school, 2( the quality inspector and the director
of machine tool work Group I) had received higher second-
ary school education, and 1( the director of machine tool
work Group II) was a post-secondary graduate.
Types of Employment
As far as the current situation was concermed. the
types of employment in the factory could be classified into
4 categories: employed as regular employee, as apprentice,
as work-peasant, and as "in-store" temporary worker. But
the broad differences underlying these types of employment
was whether these employees were permanently or temporarily
employed.
A. Regular Worker
Among the 81 employees, 42 (51.996) were regular
employees who were townsmen, and 89% of them were Huan-cheng
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Townsmen. In principle, these regular employees were per-
manently employed by the factory( See Table 3.8). That
meant that if the employee had not made any serious mis-
takes( e.g. committed crime, against government etc.),
the factory would have no right to dismiss him. But on the
other hand, he could not leave for other jobs unless he got
a permit from the factory. If he insisted on leaving, he
would have to give up his previous seniority( which was
significant for his wage readjustment), since the factory
would not certify his previous working experience.
B. Apprentice
In usual cases, the employee had to work for at
least 3 years before he could be considered as a regular
employee. In the first 3 years of employment, if he was
served as a production worker, he would be treated as an
apprentice even though he might have been working indep-
endently. If he was a staff member3, he would be regarded
.
as a probationary employee. After his 3 years of service,
140





Regular employee 5 1.9
Apprentice 2509
Worker-peasant 18.5
In--stores temporary worker 3.7
Total (N) (81)
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he would be publicly appraised by both his workmates and
the factory authority. If he was a production worker, he
even had to sit for an examination of his technical skills.
The results of the appraisal and the examination, as well
as the final decision of the OIT would determine whether he
could stay in the factory as a regular employee or not.
Therefore during the period of apprenticeship or probation,
he was not yet permanently employed because the factory
might decide to discharge him or not pass him in the app-
raisal.
In July 1979, the number of employees who were
employed as apprentices in this factory was 21, constituting
25.9% of the total employees( Also see Table 3.8). Among
them, 15 were machine tool operators, 4 were benchworkers,
and the other 2 were an electric welding worker and the
quality inspector. These apprentices were all townsmen.
C. Worker-peasant
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Since it was once the policy of the CPC and the OIT
to assign peasants to work in the commune-run enterprises,
some of the employees of this factory were drawn from the
rural production teams. Those who were drawn in the 1950s,
had already transferred their domiciles to town but those
drawn after 1960 were still domiciled at the production
teams and were employed only as worker-peasants in the
factory.
In 1979, 15 employees( 18,5%) were worker-peasants,
and they carne from 12 different production brigades of
Huan-cheng Commune. Because their domiciles remained in
the production teams, they were still regarded as team
members. They differed from the other team members only.
in the sense that their work positions were in that factory,
not in the field.
Unlike the townsmen, they did not receive any ration
ticket from the state. They had to buy grain and meat from
their own production teams. For an exchange of their grain
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and meat quotas, they had to give E6.00- 8.00 per month to
the production team, and this amount of money constituted
about 16.2%- 21.6% of their monthly wages. Moreover, as
they belonged to the production team, the team had the
power to call them back at any time. Consequently they
could never become regular employees in the factory and
their employment was 'long-term' temporary, unless they
managed to transfer their domiciles either to the town or
to the commune level.
As far as the 15 worker-peasants in this factory
were concerned, 3( 20%) were staff( 1 cashier, 1 driver,
1 cook), and the others were production worker( 6 machine
tool operator, 4 benchworkers, 1 electrician and 1 carpent-
er). Most of them( 695-o/) were recruited during the years
1970-71, and 4( 26.6%) were newly recruited in 1976 and
1977. All these worker-peasants were male. Most of them
(93%) had finished at least primary school and 6 had even
finished the lower secondary school. (See Table 3.9)
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D. In--store Temporary Worker
In addition to the apprentices and the worker-
peasants who were in some sense temporarily employed, there
was another type of temporary worker in this factory. These
were the “in-store”( Ji Carp temporary workers.寄 □
In 1977 and 1978, the factory had admitted 5 Hui-cheng Town
school graduates (Zhi Shi Qing Nian who in知 識 青 年
fact ought to have been working as peasants in the product-
ion teams of Huan-cheng Commune. The fathers of these
school graduates were the leading cadres( e.g. general
manager, section chief, production director, etc.) in the
County factories at Hui-cheng Torn(e .g. Xin Hui Nitrogen-
ous Fertilizer Manufactory, Xin Hui Second Agricultural
Manchinery Manufactory, Xin Hui Foundry, Xin Hui Dredge
Team etc.). Since the factory depended on these leading
cadres for the supplies of sub-contracting dealings and
quotas of raw materials, it had to accept their demands and
employ their children as temporary workers. As a result,
these school graduates neither had to work as peasants nor
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have their domiciles transferred to the production teams.
Their transference of work location from the production
teams to this commune-run enterprise was permitted by the
CPC and OIT.
Informally, their workmates called them in-store
temporary workers because their orientations were not to
this factory. Whenever their fathers found them permanent
jobs in Hui-cheng County Factories, they would leave. Hence
in 1979, only 3 of them remained behind 2 were electrician
and the other one was a lathe operator.
Labour Grades and Wages
The basic wages of an employee varied directly with
the labour grade he belonged to. Without taking the apprent-
ices into consideration, the employees of this factory bel-
onged to 5 different labour grades( See Table 3.10). In
general, the apprentices were not considered as standard
labour (Grade I labour), and they were paid according to
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3rd year of apprenticeship 13.6
2nd year of apprenticeship 9.9
lst year of apprenticeship 4.9
Total (N) (81)
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their year of apprenticeship. For the first, second, and
third years of apprenticeship, their monthly basic wages
were $20.00 $22.00 and $26.00 respectively (See Table
3.11)
After the 3 years of apprenticeship, if they succ-
eeded in transforming their status to regular workers, they
would be regarded as Grade I labour. The monthly basic
wages for Grade I labour was $32.00. In the next year, if
they also passed the more advanced internal examination of
technical skills, they would then be promoted to labour
Grade II. Hence, the shortest time span for a newly re-
cruited apprentice to be promoted to Grade II labour was
4 years.
As for the probationary administrative or minor
staff, the normal time span for them to reach labour Grade
II was 3 years only. Since they did not have to acquire
technical skills like the production workers, they did not
have to sit for any examination of their performance. It was
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3rd year of apprenticeship 26,oo
2nd year of apprenticeship 22.00
lst year of apprenticeship 20.OO
Each Employee 35.2O
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assumed that they could grasp their job well within one
year's practical work.( Their monthly Wages during the
first year were 90% of the Grade I labour wages.) And even-
though they were still on probation during their second
year of service, they were already regarded as Grade I
labour, and their monthly wages were $32.00. In the next
year, they would automatically be transformed into Grage II
labour. The monthly basic wages for Grade II labour in
this factory were either 37.00 or '38.00 giving an aver-
age of $37.10 (Also see Table 3.11).
For subsequent promotion of labour grades( i.e.
from Grade II onwards), all the regular employees, whether
they were production workers or staff, had to wait for the
wage readjustment programme issued by the central govern-
ment at an unknown date. This was one of the reasons why
most of the employees(44.4%) remained as Grade II labour.
Unlike the townsmen employees, the worker-peasants
were considered as the Grade I labour even in their first
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year of employment. In the second year, they were automat-
ically promoted to the Grade II labour. This situation
applied regardless of their work types. That meant that
eventhough they were still learning their skills like other
apprentices or probationary staff, yet they were paid diff-
erently. In the first year, they were paid $32.00( Grade
I labour wage) and in the second,$37.00( Grade II labour
wage).
They were paid on these scales mainly because the
factory considered the difficulties they might have if they
were paid according to the scales of the apprentices or
probationary staff. Because every month they had to give
$6.00- 8.00 back to the production teams, if they were
paid as apprentices, in the first, second and third years
of the employment, the monthly wages left at their own dis-
posal would be only $12.00- 14.00 $14.00- 16.00 $18.00-
24.00 respectively. Although their wages were higher than
those of the apprentice and probationary staff, they remained
there.' Since they were not regular employees in the factory,
152
they had no part in the subsequent promotion to higher lab-
our grades or wage readjustment. Thus among the 15 worker-
peasants in this factory, 14( 93.3%) of them( except the
old carpenter) were Grade II labur, irrespective of their
seniority and work types. This was also one of the reasons
accounting for the relatively high percentage( 44.4%) of
Grade II labour among the employees in the factory.
As far as the in-store temporary workers were
concerned, usually they were treated as ordinary apprentices.
Although they were not potential regular employees like
the ordinary apprentices, they were normally paid according
to the apprentice scale. But there was one exception. One
of the in-store temporary workers requested to have Grade
I labour wages( $32.O0) though she was only in her second
year of apprenticeship. Because of her father's status, she
made it. Therefore she was counted as Grade I labour.
As a whole, the average monthly basic wage of all
the employees was $35.20 (See Table 3.11). The range was
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from Y56.50 (Grade V) to 20.00 (first year of apprent-
iceship). The largest difference between subsequent grades
of monthly wages lay between Grade IV and Grade III( X51.30
- X43.60= Y7.70). Without taking the worker-peasants
into consideration, the average seniority of each labour
grade was as shown in Table 3.12. The range was from 21.8
years to 2.3 years. The largest difference between the
average seniority of subsequent grades of labour lay bet-
ween Grade III and Grade II( 14.3 years- 5.5 years= 8.8
years).
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TABLE3.12 AVERAGE SENIORITY OF EACH GRADE OF LABOURa IN











a. Excluding the worker-peasants.
b. Including the worker-peasantse
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TABLE3,13: WORK TYPES BY GRADES OF LABOURa IN THE FACTORY, JULY 1979
Labour Grades
Work Types
V IV III II I Apprentice
( % ) ( % ) ( % ) ( % ) ( % ) ( % )
Managerial staff 4000 66.7 2.8 5.0
Administrative staff 33e3 5.6
Minor staff 20.0 1.3.9
Machine tool operator 40,o 2500 4+2.9f1.7
71.4
Benchworker






worker 2500 208 4.8
Carpenter
Total (N) (5) (6) (Lb) (36) (7) (21)
a. Including the worker-peasants.
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SECTION THREE: AUTHORITY STRUCTURE OF THE FACTORY
The genreal manager as well as the chairman of the
OIT claimed that the authority structure of this factory was
the Factory Managing Committee (FMC) which was composed of
members who were representing both the interests of the fa-
ctory and the employees in majority.
Factory Managin Committee
The FMC had been known as the Revolutionary Leading
Group (RLG) before 1976( see also P. 41) The head of
the FMC was the general manager Fang-hong, who was directly
appointed by the OIT and CPC. Being the Secretary of the
Party branch( see also P. 98), he represented the Party
to manage the whole factory. Except for the deputy manager,
Ye-ging, who was also appointed by the OIT and CPC, all the
other 4 members of the FMC were appointed by him. The irr-
egularly convened the FMC meetings, and occasionally the
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appointed directors of the workshops were invited to sit in
the meetings.
Among the 4 appointed FMC members, 3 were declared
as representing the workers in majority since they were
the heads of the workers' associations within the factory.
Quo-qiang was the new secretary of the Communist Youth
League Branch (CYLP). Ai-ling, the storehouse keeper, was
claimed to be the delegate of the women association of the
factory. Ou-zhong, who had long been in the RLG( see also
P. 45) was the representative of the militia in the
factory. The other FMC member was the salesman, Jiang-shan,
who was the former general manager of the Huan-cheng comm-
une-run paper mill. The general manager asserted that Jiang-
shan's participation in the FMC was to represent the staff,
and hence indicated that the assignment of employees into
the FMC was regardless of their work types.
In fact, as long as all the members of FMC were
appointed rather than elected, there was no guarantee that
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they were really representing the employees in majority.
Moreover, even their positions as delegates of the work-
ers' associations were also appointed by the general man-
ager. Hence, their representativeness was more doubtful.
Furthermore, as the memberships of the women association
and militia were involuntary 3, and these associations
rarely organized their own activities, it was indeed very
difficult to assume that ehese so called delegates were
in fact representing the interests of their association mem-
bers. As for the secretary of the CYLP, he himself was
actually a managerial staff (appointed director of the
machine tool work group II) in charge of the workers'
production rather than a production worker-
Not only analytically there were queries about the
representative was of the FMC members, also actually the
workers also complained against the aptointive membership
system of the FMC. 3 out of the 4 appointed members were
regarded by the workers as the snoopers of the general man-
ager, who had never said no to the general manager and let
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alone they would represent their interests. Besides, the
appointed directors of the workshops who were invited to sit
in the FMC meetings were also regarded as the gneeral man-
agers' henchman who had never advocated anything the gen-
eral manager disliked. It was very difficult to tell what
the worker's complained were true or not. Yet objectively
the appointment system could be a good facilitation for that.
Some of the FMC members( Ye-qing and Quo-qiang)
also conceded that the FMC system in this factory was only
a name, and in reality it was one-man management( Yi
Zhang Zhi). They said conventionally it was Party that
exercised overall leadership, and hence only the secretary
of the Party branch( i.e. the general manager) had the
final say in all decision making. As the general manger
always kept to his own decision, structurally he could make
it the decision of the FMC. The FMC members could express
their (ipinions, but the final decisions were still the de-
cisions of the general manager. Voting was very rarely
practised, and the power was centralized on the general
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manager alone.
The FMC in this factory was an administrative de-
cision-making group which was formulated by the general
manager in such a way that on the one hand it seemed to
represent the interests of the majority( the members app-
ointed were all namely the delegates of the workers' ass-
ociations), and on the other hand it was under his control
( the members appointed might or might not be his henchmen,
yet so far as they were appointed by him, they probably
would not be the one who against him.) Besides this admin-
istrative decision-making group, in the daily production
operation there was also a group of managerial staff who
were responsible for implementing the policies and decisions
made. Of course this group to certain extent overlapped
with the FMC. Some people take part in both the administra-
tive and executive work.
Composition of the Managerial Staff
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The managerial staff did not directly participate
in production. They managed the work procedures, disciplines
and checked the production results of the workers. The gen-
eral manager, the deputy manager,*the directors of the work-
shops, as well as the quality inspector were all belonged to
this category.( See Fig 3.1) Their roles were described
as follows:
A. the general Manager
The general manager was, in principle, responsible
for all aspects of the factory, with emphasis on managing
the political attitudes of all the employees, and directing
the development of the factory. In practice, he convened
the FMC meetings and the workers' assemblies announced the
official documents, set up the management systems, issued
orders and kept work disciplines,and also represented the
factory in OIT meetings.
B. The Deputy Manager
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Since the deputy manager in this factory was not
Party member, he did not have the power to make final deci-
sion on any matter that concerning the political policy of
the factory. His role expectation were to take charge of
the production proceedings and technological innovations.
As far as the concrete production proceedings were concerned,
he was the one whom dealers got in touch with when they came
to the factory. According to the demands of the customers,
he would arranged the production procedures for each deal.
For example, when a customer came here to have the bearing
parts of his thresher repaired, first of all, the deputy
manager would record the deal. Based on the technical
require,ents, he would break the whole piece of repair work
into more detail production procedures: the assembling pro-
cedures and the production of bearings. The tasks would
then be assigned to the benchwork workshop and the machine
tool workshop in respect. The content of the assignment
included the fixing of time rate for each minute task, and
4
stating of every details of the production procedure. All
these particulars were listed out on the specification slip
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which would be sent along with the blueprints ( if any) to
the directors of the corresponding workshops. Finally, with
reference to the actual work hours spent infach production
step, and plused the prices of the ready-made fittings used
in the repair, he would state the amount the customer had
to paid on the specification slip. The slip would be served
as the bill and kept by the cashier.
Besides taking charge of the assignment of tasks,
the deputy manager always had to be available for handling
the technical problems poped up during production. Whenever
the workers had any question on the work specifications and
technical skills, they would consult him direct. Thus, he
came to the workshops at least twice a day to apprehend the
current production situation.
C. The directors of Workshops
The positions of directcr of workshop were newly
introduced in 1977. Such new practice aimed at releasing
part of the work load of the deputy manager. Before 1977,
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the deputy manager not only had to specify details in pro-
duction procedures, set the time rates, and distribute
different types of tasks to the corresponding workshops, he
also had to assign the tasks specifically to individual
workers. After introducing the position of workshop dir-
ector, the assignment of tasks to specific person became
the duties of these directors.
Although there were 6 workshops in the factory, only
2 had director. It was partly because the numbers of work-
ers in the wood workshop, the forge workshop, electrical
workshop, and electric welding workshop were small( 1, 3,
7 and 3 in respect). In the case of electrical work work-
shop, so far as the deputy manager assigned the tasks to the
5
group and without job specifications and set time rates,
the task assignment system was not complete in this workshop.
The formal system of task assignment to specific person was
not practised and no director was appointed to this electric
welding workshop, the situation was in a way quite similar
to the electrical group. The task assignment system was
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also not practised in this workshop. But the reason behind
was not the same. It was because of the fact that the jobs
of these electric welding workers were directly received
from the customers. Even though sometimes the production
procedures of the benchwork needed electric welding, such
production procedure was already included in the specifi-
cation slip of the benchwork task. In that circumstances,
the benchworkers just had to come over to this workshop and
had their workpiece welded, instead of waiting for the deputy
manager to assign this work step again. Therefore, as there
was no task assignment, the position of director was also
unnecessary in this workshop.
The workshops which had directors were the machine
tool workshop and the benchwork workshop. Since there were
2 shifts in the machine tool workshop, 2 directors were app-
ointed and each took charge of one work group. Therefore,
including the director of the benchwork workshop, there
were altogether 3 workshop directors in the factory. These
3 directors were in fact the former chief group leaders on
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political affairs( Zheng Zhi Ban Zhang of the
workshops who were responsible to lead the occasional group
discussions during workers' assembies, public appraisal
and other political meetings. In 1977, their status was
transformed from production worker to the directors of the
workshops and became the managerial staff. Besides dis-
tributing the assigned tasks from the deputy manager to
individual workers, they were also appointed to manage the
work discipline within the workshops.
D. The Quality inspector
The quality inspector was responsible for checking
the machine tool products to see if they were up to the high
precision standard. This quality checking system was intro-
duced in early 1979 because the major dealer of the factory
-- Xin Hui Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufactory( Xin Hui Dan
Fei Chang)-- complained about the low quality of the parts
and fittings the machine tool workshop produced. This qual-
ity inspector was originally a blueprint drawer, and she was
政 治 班 長
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still in her third year of apprenticeship. She was neither
regarded as production worker, nor put under the supervision
of the directors of the workshop. As she was authorized to
check the production results of all the machine tool oper-
ators, she belonged to the managerial staff.
Again, similar to the case of FMC, the work positions
of these managerial staff ( except the deputy manager) were
also appointed directly by the general manager. The director
of the machine tool work group II, Guo-giaing, was also FMC
member. For the other 2 directors, Su-wen and Quan-shui,
they were sometimes invited to sit in the FMC meeting. To
the workers, they were also the henchmen of the general man-
ager.
In short, the authority structure of the factory
was composed of 2 groups, the decision-making group, FMC,
which was dominated by the general manager, and also the
group of executive staff who held formal managerial work
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positions. The first group to certain extent overlapped
with the second group. The promotion to these two group
was through appointment by the general manager. This
promotion through appointment system gave rise to many
greviances and the feeling of unfairness among the workers.
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SECTION FOUR: GRIEVANCES OF THE WORKERS
About the Managerial Staff
The grievances of the workers were mainly about the
general manager Fang-hong, and secondly about the directors
of the workshops, Quan-shui and Su-wen.
A. The General Manager
The workers criticized the managerial style of the
general manager as being bureaucratic, unfair, and dictat-
7
orial. They gave examples to back up their evaluation.
For example:
He is bureaucratic...
A few years ago he was not like that. Around
1971 and 1972, when he had just been transfer-
red from the status of an ordinary worker to
being a general manager, he was unassuming
and easy to approach, He always came down to
the workshops, worked with us, and knew the
actual working situation here. If we had
violated the rules or made bad performances,
he would talk to us in person, and understand
our problem. But during these years, he had
changed. May be in these years the factory
has grown. It has more workers, more equip-
ment. Especially in the recent three or four
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years, it has made profits and been appraised
by the OIT an advanced model. The general
manager thinks that this was to his credit
and he feels complacent with himself. Very
seldom he comes down to the workshops. At
most two to three times per month. For ex-
ample this month, we haven't seen him except
in the workers' assembly. But in fact we
don't want to see him. No matter whether
he appears or not, we do the same work. When
you first came and asked us what are his
daily jobs, we told you that we didn't know,
It's true. It's not an excuse for not telling
you. We really don't know. We just wonder
how much he contributes to the factory...
He rarely came down here, but he likes to
criticize people. Only basing on his hench-
小 扱mans' 'sky rpnnrt' (Xiao Ran Gao
告 ), he criticizes people. Most of his
henchmen have been appointed as the directors
or the group leaders of the workshops. Some
of them have even been included in the Fact-
ory Managing Committee (FMC). He simply takes
their malicious remarks as facts, and with-
out further investigation, he criticizes the
accused workers by name. Usually he says in
the workers' assembly, 'I know recently many
of you have violated the factory rules in
particular Xiao Zheng's case is very serious'
In the monthly evaluation, he bases only on
the work records to criticize those with bad
performances. He never goes deep into the
matter before he makes his criticisms. Some-
times it is not the workers' fault. No one
wants to produce waste products, but many of
the machine tools are too old. No matter
how many times we repair them, their precision
is low and hence waste products are produced.
He is unfair...
He alwas 'goes back on h i. nwn wnrr ( Chu Er
ran Er The reason behind
this is nothing more than he is indulgent to
those who flatter him. For example last month
(June, 1979) in one of the workers' assemblies,
出 尔 反 尔 )
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eight persons were absent. Four were workers
and the other four were members of the FMC.
Among these four FMC members, three were
his henchmen. He didn't want to punish them.
So he said as if he was very lenient to us
all, 'Since there are so many of you absent,
there must be a special reason for that.
Okay, this time I won't count it. I know, it
will be very distressing if so many of you
have to be punished.'...
This event evidently displayed our general
manager's partiality. It happened last year
1978). The group of electricians went to
Zhao Xing to spend their week-( 肇 庆 )
end, but didn' come back until the next
Tuesday morning. Since they hadn't notified
the factory authority about their absence
on Monday, they had violated the rules and
regulations. Besides, 'having fun' wasn't
a sufficient reason for taking leave here.
In addition, it so happened that on that
day some of the motors of the machine tools
broke down and were in need of their repair.
Some of the machine tool operators had to
hold up work due to their absence. Just on
that Monday night workers' assembly, the
general manager criticized them and said
that if they came back, they would be pun-
ished. They had to write statements of
repentance and make apologies to all the
workers. But when the'actually came back,
our general manager neither ordered them to
write the sttement of repentance,*nor asked
them to make apologies. They only had to
work for an extra evening to compensate for
their one-day leave. In the subsequent
workers' assembly, our general manager even
praised them for their contribution to the
factory as they had worked for an extra ev-
ening. Most of the workers were not con-
vinced by the manager's nonsensical reasoning.
They considered that he was in fact partial to
the group of electricians, because among these
ten electricians, one is his henchman. two
are 'in-store' temporary workers( Ji Cang
寄and another one is his nephew.倉
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"He is dictatorial...
He pays no regard to our opinions. Take Ai-
ling's case for example: Ai-ling is the store-
house keeper of our factory. She came here in
1976 as a probationary stall member. But one
year later she managed to bedome a regular
staff. She is the type of person who plays
tricks. She knows how to please the general
manager. So, only one year after she had
been here, the general manager wanted to
transfer her to be a member of the regular
staff. According to the regulations set by
the OIT, in transferring an apprentice or
probationary worker to become a regular wor-
ker, the factory authority has to inquire into
the opinions of the workers. Thus administ-
ratively the general manager had to ask us
our opinion about Ai-ling's transference.
Most of us disliked her. The result of the
public appraisal was three out of the five
groups of workers opposed her transference.
But regardless of our objections, the general
manager clung relentlessly to his own course,
and finally Ai-ling was transferred to be a
regular staff, member. As far as this event
was concerned, we were very discontented with
his sham democracy. As we always say, 'If
you take no heed of our opinion, then why ask
us?' He just pretends to be democratic. His
inquiry is only form. Actually he pays no
respect to us ...
Our general manager has a 'golden month' (Jin
Kou 金 口 ). Only what he says counts.
What we workers say doesn't count. For exam-
ple, in the public appraisal of annual awards
in 1978, through the group discussions in the
workshops some of his henchmen were only app-
raised to third grade. But in the final list,
their names appeared in the first grade column.
Again, only our general manager's words have
weight, ours don't ...
We label our factory the 'independent kingdom'
(Du Li Wang Guo 独 立 王 国 ) because we'
ve got a King (the general manager) here.
What he says is 'law' and noone can go against
the 'law'...
174
He not only rejects others' opinions, someti-
mes he criticizes those who hold different
opinions by name. For example, in today's
8
voluntary harvest most of the day-shift
machine tool operators have complaints be-
cause their problem has not yet been solved.
Usually voluntary harvest starts at 4 p.m.
Before the harvest, the day-shift machine
tool operators have to work for 8 hours as
usual( 7.00 a.m.- 11.00 a.m.; 11.30 a.m.
- 3.00 p.m.) while the workers in other
workshops only have to work for 7 hours (7.00
p.m.- 11.00 a.m.; 1.00 p.m.- 4.00 p.m.)
Therefore, the machine tool operators think
that is unfair. Last year, some of them
suggested that on the day of harvest they
would like to follow the work schedule of
the other workshops. The general manager
not only rejected their suggestion, but also
criticized by name in the workers' assembly.
He publicly insulted them as narrow-minded
persons who not only 'haggle over every jin'
(Jin Jin Ji Jiao 斤 斤 计 较
9
, but
haggle over every Liany'(Liang Liang Ji
Jiao 两 两 计 较
10
Since then people
don't make suggestions to him any more. They
take a passive attitude and are slack in work
If it was two or three years ago when he still
had the 'political cudgel'( Zheng Zhi Bang Zi
政 治 棒 子 ), he might succeed in com-
pelling us to submit to his orders and crit-
icisms. But nowadays he can only manipulate
economic means in order to "command" (Tong
Shuai 统 帥 ) us ... Yet, as long as we
are not being convinced, even if he were an
expert in the manipulation of rules and money
incentives, we could still find loopholes in
them -- but in fact he is not at all good at
that."
B. The Directors of the Workshops
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All three directors were appointed by the general
manager, Fang-hong. Among them, teo were regarded as Fang-
hong's henchmen. They were Quan-shui, the director of the
henchwork, the smithy and the electric welding workshops,
and Su wen, the director of the machine tool workshop.
Most of the workers were discontented with these two
directors. They thought that these two directors always
spoke ill of them in front of Fang-hong so as to claim
credit for themselves. According to what the workers said,
they liked to catch other people out on the sly. They did
not point out mistakes on the spot and hence did not give
the workers any chance to correct them. Whenever they man-
aged to find fault with any worker( not only those under
their direct management), they would deliberately exagger-
ate or even distort the matter in front of Fang-hong. They
used such means to show their effectiveness and significance
as the directors of the workshops. Sometimes they played the
double-dealing trick. They lured the workers on to criticize
Fang-hong and then behind their backs they told Fang-hong who
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had dispraised him. In such ways they fawned up Fang-hong
and thus gained credit from him. The workers were very
displeased with their manoeuvres. They complained,
These directors know nothing about manage-
ment, what they know is only sending 'sly
reports' to the general manager. In fact,
they are very stupid. The more 'sly reports'
they send only means the more problems they
can't solve in their workshops. If so many
workers commit faults in the workshops, it
simply reflects how bad their managerial
techniques are. Of course, they know noth-
ing, Toadyism is all they know. What else
do they know?
The workers resented this style of management. They
were dissatisfied with Fang-hong because he made criticisms
without investigation, and even worse, he liked to criticize
them by name. They disliked these two directors because
they did not point out their mistakes on the spot, and even
worst, they exagLerated the seriousness of their faults.
About the Factory
The workers made many complaints against the factory.
Their resentment was so extreme that sometimes they gave
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me the impression they would never consider anything good
as long as it was related with the factory. Their grievan-
ces were concerned with two aspects in particular: first,
the type of industry, and second, the ownership. The second
aspect was the main source of their grievances. If the
factory was not a commune-run enterprise but a state-owned
enterprise, their detestation of the industry would probably
be less.
A. Concerning the Industry
Most of the young workers, who had been here for
more than four years, expressed the view that if they could
have the freedom to choose their jobs again, they would pro-
bably choose another line rather than this one. The follow-
ing comment was quite typical,
If possible, I really want to change my line
now. I remember when I'd just left school, I
wished I could be assigned to work here. At
that time, many of the young Huan-cheng Towns-
men wished to work here. Although the work
here is manual, yet compared with other com-
mune-run enterprises, it belongs to the semi-
mechanical type. The work is not so tough as
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that in the construction team, or in the
farm machinery station. At least we can
work "under a tile shelter" (You Wa Zhe
Tou Besides we can learn有 瓦 □ 头 )
technical skills here. I remember when I
was still in my apprenticeship, I was very
keen in learning the skills. But after
working for three to four years, I gradually
realized that the skills I acquired won't
led me to anything or anywhere. But the
greasy filth sticking on my hands the white
hot iron chippings and shavings that fly
into my eyes, and also the loud noise of
the machines do harm my body... I have
been here for seven years. Maybe the com-
mon saying is true, 'whatever job you take
up, sooner or later you will be bored with
it'. I really wish I could change my line
now."
When asked about the jobs they preferred, most of
them, irrespective of sex, gave priority to service. trades.
As one of them put it in this way,
I wish I could work in the service trades.
Their( i.e. the salesclerks in Hui-cheng
Department Store) salary system is appro-
ximate to ours. The monthly salary of their
second grade labour is even higher than ours
by x1.00. They get X38.00. But this diff-
erence is still secondary. The important
thing is that when you work in the commerci-
al services sector, you have more conveniences.
First of all, more goods would be at your
reach. In here, though you've money, you may
not be able to buy the goods you need. Even
if you get ration tickets, you still have to
wait in long queues. Besides, there is no
guarantee. For example, every day after work
(5.00 p.m.) it is very difficult to buy food
in the market. If I worked in the commercial
sector, I would know more people in the same
line. Then, we could help each other. You
sell me rice and I sellou pork. You see
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ment of the administrative region Huan-cheng Town in 1972
that these people were included in the Huan-cheng Commune,
and were regarded as the Huan-cheng Townsmen. Since that
time they could find jobs only in either the Huan-cheng
Town street factories or in the commune-run enterprises.
They always questioned the administrative policy
which restricted them to work in Hui-cheng Town. They
considered that they also originated from Hui-cheng and
there was no substantial difference between they and the
Hui-cheng people. They were also competent in working in
the state-owned enterprises in Hui-cheng, but just because
their domiciles had been transferred to Huan-cheng, they
were only eligible to work in the commune-rur. tenterprises.
As a result, they always compared their work situation with
that of the Hui-cheng Town state-owned factory workers.
They repeatedly mentioned that,
Compared to the workers in Hui-cheng state-
owned factories, our salaries are much less
than theirs. Doing the same kind of work,
they get more pay. Their first four grades
of salaries are respectively 134.50 IE40.00
Y47.00 and U32.00. Ours are W32.00 iz37,00
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X45.00 and8.00. Besides, for every one
and a half year, each of them gets a suit of
working clothes and a pair of leather shoes.
But what we can get is only Y8.00. Sometimes
if the OIT claims that they have no money, we
even cannot get this Y8.00. As for retirement
fund, the workers in the state-owned factory
can get 75% of their salary, and for us, only
65%
'The reward system was not the only focus of com-
-oarison. The workers also considered that there were no pros-
pects in working at this factory as long as it was a comrmane-
run enterprises were usually small, structured in work organ-
ization and less formalized in the management system, but also
due to the fact that these enterprises were unstable. That
the workers worried about was,
As a commune-run enterprise, this factory
might close down at any time. For these years,
compared with other Huan-cheng commune-run
industrial enterprises, it is regarded as the
most structured and developed factory. But
once the central government advocates economic
readjustment, it collapses. If it was a state-
owned factory, we don't have to worry about
this. Even if the state closed it doFrn, we
would be allocated to other state-owed enter-
prises. But in our case, it this factory
closes down, we would be assigned to other
commune-run enterprises which obviously have
worse working conditions than here. For
example, just last month, four of our apprent-
ices were transfered to the fish fry breeding
ground. Though they can retain their original
salary levels, the work there is much tougher.
They have to work like peasants.......
If we ever find permanent jobs in Hui-cheng,
definitely We will go. ?ut it's not easy.
It depends on connections. If your father
holds a high position, that's another story.
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Surely the development of the factory did infuence
the prospects of its workers. Yet the final determinant of
one's prospects was one's formal domicile, which also desided
by one's work place. These workers were obliged to vork in
the Hui-cheng commune-run enterprises because their domiciles
were at Hu:zn-cheng Tovvn, which was an administrative unit of
the Huan-cheng Commune. But if they managed to find Dermanent
jobs in Hui-cheng Town through their own means (i.e. back
door), their domiciles would be transfered together with
their new occupations to Hui-cheng Town. Even if they still
actually lived in Huan-cheng To,n, their domiciles were now
11
in Hui-cheng Town.
Once their domiciles were transfered to Hui-cheng
Town, they could legally viork in the enterprises there, no
matter wheth er the enterprises were state-owr_ed or collectively-
owned. The rew,w,ard.s as well as the welfare s,rsterrs in these
enterprises were better than those in the huan-cheni- Commune-1
run enterprises. Their ration tickets were alloted from Hui-
cheng Town and they on longer had any direct adminis Lr rive
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relation with the commune. To cut the tails that linked
them with the c omrm. ne f' (Gen Gong She Duan Wei 跟 公 社 斷 尾 ）
was their ultimat goal. As one of the workers complained,
I don't like working here. There are no
prospects here. Everything is controlled by
the commune. I don't like to have any relat-
ions with the commune. It ruins your future.
No matter how good the chance lying i n front
of you, it will be blown away because your
domicile is at the commune. I tell you my
case. Icy uncle in the U.S. has promised to
assist me and my sister to go to the U.S.
Now my sister has gone there but I an, still
here. You know tiwrhy? It's because I am
working here, in a commune-run factory. I
had to ask the commune for application forms,
but unless you've connections, it is very
difficult for you to get the forms. My sister
worked in a state-owned enterprise. So, she
didn't have to face the barrier at the
commune-level. But I have to. Till now, I
still can't get the application form. It.'s
the commune that ruins my prospects.
The location of one's domicile not only has immediate
influences on one's carreer, but to certain extent it also
of f ects one's marriage and the prospects of one's offspring.
As it, as the governmental -policy that all the children's
domiciles and class statuses (either worker or peasant) were
inherited from their mot: ers, if the female workers in this
184
factory managed to transfer their domiciles to Hui-cheng Town,
their potential marriage market would extend to Hui-cheng
Town. The children born to them were Hui-cheng Townsmen
and they could be educated and later work in Hui-cheng.
For the male workers, though their domiciles had nothing to
do with their children's domiciles, once they became Hui-
cheng Townsmen their bargaining power in the marriage market
would also be increased, It would be more likely for them
to marry female workers in Hui-cheng Tom.
The workers pref erred working in Hui-cheng i o,n.
vet their chance of getting permanent jobs there was limited.
There was no formal channel through y,rhich they could be
legally assigned to work there. Especially during the period
1973 to 1976, all the Huan-cheng Townsmen, except for those
who had already got permanent jobs in Hui-cheng To:,rn, were
strictly compelled to work in Huan-cheng Com.-rune. Although
some still managed to wore in Iiui-cheng through their back-
door relationships, such cases were not commcn. But after
1976, as the policies became lax, this situation changed.
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The workers said that ever since 1977, Huan-cheng Townsmen
were informally permitted to work in Hui-cheng Town if they
could find jobs and if their former working units allowed
them to leave.
This policy change had an immediate effect on this
factory. First of all, three of the iorkers, a planer,
two
lathe operators left the factory in early 1979. One managed
to find permanent jobs in the Xin Hui Hawser and Rope Manu-
factory (Xin Hui Sheng Lan Chuang and新 会 □ □ 广 )
another in the Hui-cheng Town Housing Administrative Office.
The factory authority allowed them to leave, mainly because
the factory had been short of tasks and had suffered loss
ever since December 1978. As some of the workers could
transfer their job while others could not, this aroused the
discontent of the workers.
The success or failure of the job transference hinged
on two, main factors. First, whether or not the worker had
someone (usually parents or close relatives) who occupied
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high positions (e. g. general manager of a factory) willing
to mobilize their connections to find jobs for him. Second,
whether or not the worker's present working unit was willing
to sign the leave-permit. As not all of the workers had
connections and most of them did not have "VIP fathers"
（ 大 粒 老 豆 ） , the workers thought these mobility methods
were unfair. They said,
There's no transference system here. Once
you're assigned here, you've to be here, Unless
you have connections and you know the lead-
ing cadres of another factory. Then you
might get a job there. We don't have such
connections and "our fathers are not 'big
enough' （ 我 哋 老 头 唔 够 大 粒 ), so,
we're stuck here till we're sixty, If you
come back here, then you will still can find
us. (laughed)
Well, that's the way things are done here.
Although they always tell you that the leading
cadres get very low salaries and their 'pro-
motions do not lead ton wealth' (Sheng Guan
Bu Fa Cai 昇 官 木 發 財 ), in fact they
have many privileges. When you build a
house, your materials are bought at 'barain-
ing prices' (Yi Jia 议 价 ), but when they
build houses, their materials are bought at
'state prices' (Guo Jia □ 价 ). They
have connections and so they get quotas
You've to work here for life, but their sons
and daughters can be transferred. That is
what we mean by 'bureaucrats connect with
Tone another' (Gunn Guan Xiang Tong 官 官 相 通
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Even if the worker managed to get a potential job in
Hui-cheng Town, he had to obtain a formal leave-permit from
the factory authority, or else he had to give up his senior-
ity as a regular worker( if he insisted on leaving). His
release depended on his relationship with the factory auth-
ority and also the current production situation of the
factory. Usually the factory authority was not willing to
let its technical workers (regular workers) leave unless the
factory needed to cut down the number of its workers. But
if the worker's 'connections' had significant meaning for
the factory (e.g, the factory had to depend on his 'someones'
to supply raw materials or production tasks), or if he had
good relations with the general manager, his chance of being
released would be increased. As the factors involved were
complicated and even covert, it was very difficult to con-
vince the workers why this particular worker ,,as allowed to
leave but not that other one. In addition, since the workers
considered the transference to another job as the hinge of
their future prospects, the changeable atti tutes of the
factory authority towards their resing ation intensified their
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discontent with the general manager and the factory (as a
colnanune-run enterprise), The arguments concerning the
transference of jobs even led to an overt dispute between
the workers and the factory authority.
The dispute occured on the 3rd of July, 1979, during
the period of my field observation. A 23 years old second
labour grade planer, Jia-xing, wanted to leave the factory.
His father, the general manager of Xin Hui Sugar Refinery
and Winery (Xin Hui Tang Jin Chang ), had
新 会 糖 酒 广
found him a job in the Hui-cheng Gunnysack Manufactory
( Hui Cheng Ma Dai Chang But the会 城 麻 袋 广 ) .
factory authority would not allow him to leave. its arnent
was that the factory at present was only lacking tasks for
the lathe operators, as for the planers there was still
plenty of ,work. Since onw of the planers (originalthere
were five) had already gone, if Jig-xing also went away the
factory viould be short of planers, but from Jia-xing's point
of view he wanted to grasp this criticial chance to leave
this commune-run factory. When he found that he was not
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allowed to leave, he was very angry. He thought the
general manager was partial to the other planer who had
just been allowed to leave for the Xin Hui Hawser and Rope
Manuf ac tory.
He lodged his protest in the form of a slowdown.
For two days, 3rd and 4th of July, he started the machine
but held up his work. He just sat in front of his shaping
machine waiting for the general manager, Fang-hong, to come.
But Fang-hong did not come down to the workshop to handle
this matter. Only the deputy manager, Ye-wing, approached
him and tried to persuade him to get back to work. Jia-
zing grasped this chance to vent his anger and a heated
dispute was started. Other workers (about 20 of them, all
male in the machine tool workshop and other workshops
also came over and joined the dispute. :bout 10 other
workers crowded around. The workers who joined in the
dispute were all on Jia-xing's side. For some time Ye-ping
was just like being 'besieged' by the workers, but in the
end the workers came to the conclusion that it was all Fang-
190
hong's fault and Ye-ping should not bear the blame for him.
The dispute was over, but Jia-xing still had to stay
because it was Fang-bong who had the final say. The next
day he still went on with his slowdown. ,'Then I had a chat
with him, he grwribled,
The general manager is unfair. He always
goes back on his word. He announced at the
workers' assembly that if we got other jobs
we could leave. I gave hime my application
for resignation on the 18th of last month.
Exactly that day's assembly, he still said
that we could leave. You were also there.
You heard him say so, didn't you? Previously
he had let another planer go. That planer
could leave, why can't I? Obviously he is
partial to him. That's unfair........
My father is not 'big enough'. He seldom
invited him to tea and has no connection with
him. Of course, he won't let' me go.........
\'ihen he won' t let you go he'll say that you're
the key technical worker in the factory and
your contribution is great. That doesn't
mean he thinks highly of you. He only rants
to keep you and let you suffer a toilsome life
here...... Whether I can leave or not totally
lies on his decision. The Factory 1.1anaging
Committee is only a name. He arrogates all
the power. I know I've got nothing to contend
with against him. I've no power. We workers
are always under him. I don't go to the
office to argue with him because he's got
his own men there. If he came doom to the
workshop, that would be different. The other
workers are on my side. He is in the .wrong.
I know he dare not come down here. So far if
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Ye-qing comes down,it would be okay. At
least I could vent my anger. I know my
slowdown will not lead to any result. They
have the power to deduct 20% of my salary
(i.e. $7.60), But I'll still keep on blaming
him and contending with him down here
You know, I've been here for 8 years. If I
just leave (without formal permit), I have
to give up my 8 years seniority. Why should
I have to do that? It's not fair!
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SECTION FIVE: MONEY INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
Money incentive system had been introduced into the
factory since 1978. The concrete ways of distributing the
bonuses were changed many times during 1978 and 1979. The
Exceed Profit Award System" (Choi Li Run Jiong Li Zhi Du
was practised in 1978, and the "Profit
Percentage Award System" (Li Run Ti Cheng Jiang Li Zhi Du
as well as the "Multiple Items Award
System" (Zong He Jiang Li Zhi Du were综 合 奖 励 制 度 ）
carried out during 1979.
Exceed Profit Award System (1978)
The award was issued by the OIT to the factory as a
whole. The only criterion the Cit used in the system to
assess the performance of the factory was profit. Whenever
the factory made profits which exceeded the seasonal target
set by the OIT, it could take 15% of the excess portion as
bonus. But the amount of bonus could not exceed 25% of the
超 制 润 奖 励 制 度 ）
利 润 提 成 奖 励 制 度 ）
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total wages of the factory. As for the actual amount of
bonus obtained by any one individual, there was no limit.
For the second half of 1978, this factory received $1,523.00
as its excess profit bonus.
The bonus was distributed among all the workers and
staff in the factory. The criteria adopted in the distri-
bution were political attitudes (measured by attendance in
the workers' assembly), work attendance, output value produced
(for workers only), quality of products (for machine tool
operators only), number of hours used in repairing the
machine, and also expenses of set-uDs. Each of these criteria
was further broken down into quantitative indicators which
carried points. If the workers and staff did not fulfil the
indicators, a certain amount of their basic points (each one
was assigned 100 basic points) would be deducted. Based on
number of points retained, every one except those with points
less than 60 was assigned one' of three different grades of
awards., For the second half of 1978, all the 15 managerial
and minor staff received awards. 12 of them got $19.90 and
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the other three had respectively 112.40 111.20 and X17.40.
Thus on average, each member of staff received Y18.65 as
bonus. As for the 83 production workers, 73 of them were
eligible for awards. On average, each of them received
Y17.04. The mode was around 120.00 and the range lay
between-V-0.87 and y34.27.
Profit Percentage Award System (1979)
The Exceed Profit Award System was replaced by the
Profit Percentage Award System and the Multiple Items Award
System in early 1979. These changes were initiated by the
OIT. At the end of 1978, the OIT did-not foresee that. the
work tasks for machinery industry would sharply decrease,
and it set high profit targets (respectively Y-20,000.00
-m2 j, 000.00 and Y20,000.00 for the four reasons) for this
factory in 1979. Since these targets were too high to reach,
the Exceed Profit 'Award System became impracticable, the Profit
Percentage Award System was then introduced instead.
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The Profit Percentage Award System only applied to
the managerial and minor staff of the factory. The Product-
ion workers obtained their bonuses from the Multiple Items
Award System. In the Profit Percentage Award System, if the
factory made profits up to 10% of the target, it could obtain
an additional 5% of its managerial and minor staff's total
wage as bonus. Above that, whenever its profits increased
by 10% of the target, the factory could get another 2% more
of its staff's total wages as bonus, Drovided that amount of
bonus it took could not exceed 25% of its staffs' total wages.
As the average staff wage was $40.00, the maximum average
bonus per staff was about, $10.00, but there was no limit set
for the amount of bonus each individual staff could get.
Usually the bonus obtained was distributed by the general
manager to each of the managerial and minor staff members.
The general manager appraised the staff into three grades.
The bonus each grade carried always varied, since the total
sum of bonus the factory got and also the number of staff in
each grade differed from time to time.
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Multiple Items Award System (1979)
Unlike the Profit Percentage Award System which
Concerned the macro-management between the OIT and the
factory, this Multiple Items Award system was an incentive
system the factory authority itself adopted to mobilize the
production workers. It was a micro-management measure operat-
ing within the factory. The amount of bonus it carried was
counted as part of the labour cost.
The details of this system were formulated not by
the OIT, but by the general manager of the factory. During
the first seven months of 1979, the details of this award
system was altered three times (in March, April, and June o
Although the concrete enumeration of the amount of bonus
each worker could get was changed from time to time (e.g.
whether it was to be calculated in unit points or in unit
labour hours how these points or labour hours should be
converted in money terms), the criteria used in the assess-
ment v ere basically the same. The aviard system was composed
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of four items of bonus: The exceed-time-rate bonus, the full-
attendance bonus, the spare-set-ups bonus, and the product-
quality bonus. (details see appendix IV)
These four bonus items were comprehensively linked
up under the Multiple Items Award System. Among these items,
the amount of award or deduction by item counterweighed each
other. The resultant sum, if it was award, could not exceed
40% of the worker's wage, and if it was deduction, could only
be up to 20% of his ,wage.
The idea of implementing two separate award systems
for the production workers and the staff of the factory was
put forward by the OIT. There were two main reasons for not
applying the Profit Percentage A,wrard System to the product-
ion workers. First, its incentive mechanism did not produce
instant results as the Multiple Items Award System did.
Its distribution of bonus was by season. 14oreover, the
amount of bonus an individual got was not closely attached
to the amount of work he actually contributed. Second, as
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the factory had suffered a loss since January 1979, it had
not ever received any bonus through the Profit Percentage
Award System. If the production workers also had to acquire
their bonus through that system, they would get nothing so
long as the factory was incurring a loss. The OIT antici-
pated that if the workers did not receive any bonus while the
workers in other enterprises did, they would feel relative
deprived. Hence, it would be very difficult to mobilize
them to work and the production situation in this factory
would be even worse. As a result, the OIT initiated the
factoryy authority to set up the Multiple Items Award System
particularly for the production workers.
But as for the managerial and minor staff of the
factory, the OIT did not permit them to acquire their bonus
through the 1,Tultiple Items Award System in the way the
workers did. The reason lying behind this was quite simple,
The OIT was afraid that if the managerial staff were allowed
to participate in the distribution of bonus in that award
system, they would probably set the details of the system
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in such a way that all the workers and staff could get a
bonus regardless of their actual performance. This was what
they called stealing the ox collectively (Ji Ti Tou Niu
集 体 偷 牛 ）
As the OIT did not have a thorough understanding of
the concrete production procedures of the factory, it had
to decentralize part of its power and let the factory auth-
ority design the details of the Multiple Items Award System
by itself. On the other hand, the OIT also had to make sure
that the factory authority was on its side when designing
the award system. One of the means it used was to link the
interests of the factory authority with the profits the
factory made. This was also the reason-why the OIT insisted
that the staff (managerial and minor staff of the factory
had to participate in the Profit Percentage Award System,




The staff mainly complained about the Profit
Percentage Award System. In the first two seasons of 1979,
as the factory was suffering loss, the staff could not get
any award from the Profit Percentage Award System. Although
the OIT had already replaced the Exceed Profit Award System
with this system, it made no difference so long as the
factory had no profit. The staff wished to join the workers'
award system. Even though 3 out of 4 of the items in the
Multiple Items Award System were techically irrelevant to
their work, they insisted that they were able to participate
in the last item: the work Attendance Bonus, and $3.00
bonus per month was at least better than nothing.
As the OIT kept the original high profit targets for
the factory, the factory authority expected that for the
subsequent months it would still be very unlikely f or the
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factory to make a profit up to 10% of the targets. That
meant the probability for them to get the bonus from this
Profit Percentage Award System was low. Hence, the general
manager and the deputy manager requested the OIT to lower
the targets. They hoped that the target would be lowered
to about.y10,000.00 per season, so that it would be easier
for them to get the bonus. But their suggestion was not
taken up by the OIT and CPC. The general manager complained,
The factory incurred a loss in the first two
season of this year. We managerial staff
get no award. But other factories have. For
example, the Paper Mill, in these two seasons
the average award each of the staffs received
i s 60.00. Even for our o vvn workers, they
have the multiple-items awards. On average,
they get 20.00 each. We managerial staff
toil and moil, but ge,.t nothing (din Kau
jian Wu Quian ). The辛 苦 兼 無 錢
factory suffers from loss, the CPC and CIT
blame us for that and so we have no award.....
My opinion is: ,'Then we suggest that we rant
to join the workers in their award system,
you say that we would stand on the workers'
side and steal the with therm At -this
point, I've no comment. But now I only request
you to lower the targets. You obviously know
that the factory is lack of work, and you
ought to lower our tasks....... For this
year, the OIT has set the output value target
at $1400,000.00 and the profit target at
$190,000.00. For the first season, the ,-rofit
target is '$20,000.00. For the second season,
it's $25,000.00. For the third, it's also
$125, 000.00, and for the fourth, it's
$120,000.00. If the factory got sufficient
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tasks, you may set the target around
low 10,000.00 for each season. That'll be
reasonable......... In fact, they really
have no reason to set such heavy task for
us. Ewen if we could easily fulfil the
targets, the amount of bonus we could get
still cannot exceed 25% of our total wages.
Therefore, there wouldn't be any trouble
even though they lower the target. The OIT
should be more flexible in handling this
matter. Our demand is not much. Only give
us a little bit of incentive, about 10.00
each, and all will be settled. But the OIT
don't listen to us. They actually catch our
point, but so far as they have bonus, they
don't bother about us. As for the CPC, they
are miserly. They only know how to draw
the profits from our account...... We toil
and moil, but we get no award. For other
commune-run enterprises, they have sufficient
work. They don't have to work as hard as
we do, but they get awards. If ever our
thinkings become confused, and we take passive
attitudes in the management and in connecting
tasks, it would be no good for the factory,
and it would be no good for the commune
either."
But from the stance of the OIT, giving awards to a
factory which was incurring al loss, or lowering the product-
ion targets would have bad demonstrative effects on other
commune--run enterprises. Even though they realized the
problems, they insisted on keeping the original high profit
target and output value target. They only permitted the
managerial and minor staff of the factory to have the 3.00
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"Work Attendance Bonus per month.
B. The Workers
In general, the workers showed indifference towards
the Multiple Items Award System. Some even claimed that they
did not really know the exact enumeration of their total pre-
miums because the details of each item of the award system
were always subject to change. Within the first six months
of 1979, the general manager had already altered the details
of the Multiple Item Award Systems three times. Moreover,
as all the details where formulated by the general manager
alone, and he seldon had contact with the workers, the workers
could have only a smattering of the award system through his
formal announcement in the workers' assembly. Some of the
workers doubted whether the system was effective in the
current month. They had such hesitation because their bonuses
in May and June were not granted until July, and the delay
was due to the lack of a circulating fund in the factory.
They also said that eventhough the Multiple Items L and
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System had been practised for the previous months, they had
not gained much benefit from it. Some even asserted that
they were not eager to join the Multiple Items Award System
because the amount of bonus they could make out of it was
limited and sometimes they had to take the risk of being
Dunished.
In detail, the workers had different responses towazd-s
different items of the Multiple Items Award System. For the
item of exceeding time-rate bonus, the responses usually
varied with the workers' 7ork types. In actuality, this
item did not apply to the electricians because.the deputy
manager knew nothing about electrical work and therefore could
not set accurate time rates for their work. He simply assigned
the tasks to the group as a whole and let the group leader
arrange the jobs for each group member. Therefore, though
they had to record the time spent, there was actually no
checking system on their tempo of work. In the case of the
electric welding group, the output values the group produced
completely depende_i on the supply of tasks from the customer.
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Thus, the monthly output value target (1,800,00 set by the
factory for this group was, in a sense, meaningless. As
the supply of tasks was not constant, whether or not the
workers exceeded the target in fact did not reflect their
work performances. To them, the exceed-time-rate bonus
system did not have much effect on their work done. For the
benchwork and forge work, as the tasks were piecemeal and
miscellaneous, it was difficult for the deputy manager to
estimate the usual time needed for each task and set a
standard time rate which differentiated the diligent workers
from the lazy ones. As a result, sometimes the time rate
set for a certain task was so low that the bench workers
and the smiths could get a lot of bonus without much effort,
but sometimes it was so high that no matter how hard they
worked, they still had to punished. In response to this
situation, the problem of "picking up the fat" (Tiao Fei
was particularly serious amongJian Shou
them. Most of them prefered the low time rate tasks and at
the same time were not willing to take up the high time-rate
ones. When they found no way to escape frcm the latter type
挑 肥 揀 瘦
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of tasks, usually they would complain to the deputy manager
and request the cancelling of the time limit. Consequently
the deputy manager decided not to set any time rate unless
he knew exactly the amount of time needed for tasks. Thus
the amount of awards the benchworkers and the smiths could
get from the item of exceed-time-rate bonus was so little
that as most of their tasks were without set time-rates.
As for the machine tool work, since it was mechanical and
the time needed for each task could be estimated objectively,
the deputy manager was able to set the optimal time rate
which would allow for bonus if the workers ever worked hard
and would lead to deduction if they were lazy, Thus, com-
pared with the workers of other work types, in general the
machine tool operators had more chance to -et awards from
this exceed-time-rate bonus item. This situation gave rise
to discontent among the workers in the ether workshops and,
as a result, the full attendance bonus ite was added so that
everyone could have a chance to get a bonus regardless of
their work type. Since the full attendance bonus was Quite
easy to obtain and there was no sanction for the failure,
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most or7`ti7orlcers welcomed the introduction of this item.
Despite adding the full attendance bonus item to the
award system, some of the workers still considered that the
chance for the machine tool operators to get their bonus
was eater since they could have the product quality bonus
while others could not. The product quality bonus system
was particularly designed for the machine tool operators
because their products-- the parts and fittings-- demanded
a high level of precision (the deviation allowed was only
0.09 mm), bile other workers wanted to have quality awards
for their products, some of the machine tool operators
wanted to do without them. This was because for the machine
tool operators this bonus was very difficult to obtain. On
average only 70% of them could get the bonus, and if they
produced only one piece of waste product in a month they
would be disqualified. As the demand for precision was so
high, i t was difficult for them to avoid making as few as
one piece of waste product throughout a whole month. 'More-
over, whenever they produced waste products, a certain
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amount of their wages would be deducted as compensation and
deduction.
Workers on other types of work wanted to have quality
awards, mainly because the precision levels of their product
were much lower than those required for machine tool work.
For example, the precision of bechwork was measured in units
of mm while that of machine tool work was measured in units
of 0.00 mm. Furthermore, as the factory did not have any
quality inspection system for benchwork, electrical work or
forge work, if their products were not immediately rejected
by the customers, they would automatically be considered as
qualified for the award. As a result, the machine tool
operators felt they were unfairly treated, since both the
degree of difficulty for them to obtain the quality awards
and the chance for them to be punished were much higher
than for other workers. Again, there were complaints against
the Multiple Items Award System, and this time, they were
from the machine tool operators. Consequently, the details
of the award system would probably be altered again (in August).
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NOTES ON CHAPTER THREE
1. The record was taken at the end of 1978.
2. Among these 5 workers, 2 were in-store temporary workers.
Detail refer to P.
3. All female workers were automatically regarded as the
members of the women association. And also all the
employees under 1+9-year-old were taken as the militia.
4. This situation did not apply to the electric work and
electric welding work. The deputy manager did not know
the detail production operation in the electric work,
thus he only gives the electrical tasks to the group as
a whole. In the electric welding work, as the workers
received the majority of jobs directly from the customers.
5. See note 2.
6. As far this section is concerned, the information was
mainly gathered from the young male workers. Most of
the old workers as well as the female workers hesitated
to express their own opinions about the current situation,
This limitation should be taken into consideration v:hile
reading this section. in general, my impression was that
the old workers liked to talk about the past, and the
female workers liked to ask bout the trivial things like
fashion, clothing, and hair styles.
7. Among the examples the workers gave, I discard those that
were concerned only with personal matters that occurred
between the general manager and the informant (i.e. the
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individual worker I asked). Because these examples were
swayed with personal feelings and one-sided interpretations.
As I was not in a position to inform the general manager
about these matters, I found difficulties in judging the
objectiveness of these examples. The paragraphs I cite in
this section were events described by the workers in the
third person or the behavioural pattern of the general
managements as perceived by the workers. I cannot say that
these were the full pictures but at least they were how the
workers perceived them,
8. As this vas a commune-run enterprise, the workers had to
help the peasants to reap rice during harvest time. Every
year they had to go down to fields 20-30 times. Usually they
helperd the near-by Cheng Jiao Brigade.
9. Jin, a unit of weight (=1/2 kilogram)
10. Liang, a unit of weight (=50 grams)
11. This was one of the reasons why people of the same family
or who lived in the came location could have domiciles
at different places.
CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
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SECTION ONE: GENT AL DISCUSSION
In order to locate the social position of the factory,
two important dimensions have to be considered. First, the
ownership of the factory, and second, the industry of which
it belongs to.
As far as the ownership was concerned, this factory
was collectively owned by the Commune. The OIT, as an
agent of CFC, was responsible for supervising the political
administration and vocational development of the factory.
According to. the current political policies of the central
government, the OIT had to modify the guiding developmental
principles of the factory. Due to the frequent fluctuation
of the policies, development of the factory was basically
unstable. Especially during its early phaze (1953-1972, it
had been merged with other economic enterprises for many
times, and had once been abandoned by the commune, Such
fluctuations discouraged the initiations of the factory
leaders and the confidence of the workers on the factory.
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They might be disbanded at any time and transferred to other
commune-run enterprises owing to the frequent changes of
the administrative policies.
Besides supervising the political and developmental
policies, the OIT also guided the vocational progress of
the factory. It set production plans in terms of profit
targets and output value targets. As long as the OIT did
not assign concrete production tasks along with the product-
ion targets, and also there was no matching agency to take
care of the vocational development of the factory, the fact-
ory, had to seek for its own tasks and the necessary raw
materials through its informal business connections.
The production tasks were not planned. They were
determined by the supply and demand of the customers. But
such supply and demand differed from the market mechanisms
of the capitalist economy in. the sense that the prices were
fixed by the state, and the market was restricted only to
.
the channels other than the formal marketing channels
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monopolized by the state. For the main supplies of tasks
and raw materials, it had to depend on'-the state-ovvned
enterprises in the Hui-cheng Town. Hence, its development
was not only hindered by the changeable administrative
policies of the OIT and the government, but also obstructed-
by the unstable supplies of tasks and material.
As a commune-run factory, its leaders (the general
manager and the deputy manager) were appointed by the CPC
and OIT. The general manager was also the appointed
secretary of the Party branch in the factory. He was back
up by the CPC and OTT, and represented the Party to manage
the factory. Other than the deputy manager all the F L_C
members were appointed by him and he had the final say in
every decision made within the factory. But for the
determinations of the sources of recruitment (from Pro-
duction brigade or from the Huan-che ng Town) and the discharge
of the -,orkers, they were on the hands of the OIT and CPC.
Compared with other state-ov.,ned factories in general,
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the pay and conditions of this factory were less favourable.
The wages level was lower and the welfare facilities were
less. The size of the factory was smaller and the chances
for Dromotion to the managerial positions were more limited.
As mentioned before, the development of this factory was un-
steady. Whenever it faced the crisis of close down and had
to retrench workers, the workers would be transferred to
other commune-run enterprises.
As far as the industry was concerned, this factory
belonged to the farm machinery building industry. The workers
I
were regarded as skilled labour. Irgeneral, the wage scales.
of the skilled labour were higher than that of the semi-
skilled and non-skilled labour. But because of the fact
that this factory was only a commune-run factory, its wage
scale was only equivalent to that of the county level light
industrial enterprises. As a result, the workers of this
factory felt relatively deprived as they always compared
their working conditions with that of the skilled workers
in the state-owned factories. But, nevertheless, when
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considered only the commune-run enterprises within Huan-
cherg, the conditions of this factory were not bad. At
least the work was semi-mechanical and the worker could
acquire the industrial technique. That was the reasons
why the workers did not want to be transferred, except to
the better factories in the Hui-cheng Town.
Since 1973, the mechanization in agricultural
production had been prevalently advocated, and the farm
mechinery building industry developed rapidly. As the state-
owned farm machine manufactories were, overloaded with tasks,
they diffused part of their tasks through the sub-contract-
ing system to the factory. Consequently, the profits of the
factory steadily increased and such optimistic production
situation stimulated the develo-oment of the factory. It
recruited more workers and installed more equipment. Along
with the expansion of the factory, the organizational
structuand and management system gradually formalized.
Koreover, even the oal of the factory had been shifted from
the original propose of aidin the local agricultural product-
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ion directly to the aim of serving the industrial enter-
prises in town and indirectly support the local agricultural
production through profits accumulation. with the optimistic
anticipation on the future development of the farm machinery
building industry, the OIT set high and ever rising pro-
duction targets for the factory and hence the factory became
more and more dependent on the subcontracting dealings and
the informal connections it built up with the enterprises
in Hui-cheng Town. its develop cent was then hinged upon the
amount or subcontracting dealins it managed to find through
its connections.
Unfortunately such favourable. cr' oducti on situation
did not last very long. After the fall of the gang of four,
the government began to resconstruct the domestic economy.
In the economic readjustment prop a..ne, the farm machinery
building industry was among the first to bear the brunt.
Laren the farm machinery manufactories at county level did
not have assignment of concrete tasks from the County
Planning Committee. They ',ere short of tasks. Consequently.,
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the supply of subcontracting tasks of this factory fell
sharply and thus led to the deficient of the factory
ever since December 1978,
Such hasty change created confusion about the
future development of this factory, and the existing
formal goal of the factory was being challenged. The CPC
and OIT confused about the meaning of running this factory.
Its functions in promoting agricultural production were
being questioned. First of all, as long as it earned no
profit and even incurred a loss, it could not achieve its
aim of aiding the agricultural production through indirect
means (i.e. profits accumulation for 'the commune). Second,
the emphasis of the agricultural modernization policies
advocated by the central government had already been shifted
from the agricultural mechanization to the scientific
cultivation, and only those sophisticated hgih quality
farm machinery were allowed to produced. Therefore, as
the product quality of this commune level factory was low,
its function of promoting and popularizing agricultural
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mechanization became insignificant. Once again, owing to
the policy changes, the factory was facing the crisis of
either being closed down or being merged with the farm
machinery station. And the transference and discharge of
employees were the current key issues in this factory.
The drastic policy changes after the fall of the
gang of four had great impact on this factory. Besides
advocated the economic readjustment programme, the central
government also changed some of the political policies.
First of all, it stopped mobilizing large-scale political
movements and formally announced that the present period
was a period of open speech. As the political atmosphere
was relatively tranquil and.the people were given more free-
dom to express their opinions, the workers, especially
those young ones, dared to overtly complained about the
misdeeds of the general manager and the workshop directors,
and showed their discontents with the factory. The long
conceded conflicts and grievances busted out
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The workers disliked the coercive managerial style
of the general manager. They complained about how he pre-
viously availed of the political movements and used the
method of open critcism to compell them to submit to his
rules and orders, and also how he gave special favours and
appointed managerial positions to those workers who flattered
him. They grumbled that he had arrogated all the power
and paid no respect to their opinions. As for the dirctors
of the workshop, the workers disliked their manoeuvres of
pleasing the general manager and picking faults on them.
Before the fall of the gang of four, such grievances were
concealed owing to the tense poitical stmosphere. But as
the current political atmosphere was more relaxed, the work-
ers showed their resentment overtly, not only in their
conversations, but also in their work performances. As
the general manager no longer had the advantage of availing
the political movements to sanction them, and what he could
manupulate was only the economic means (e.g. money incentives),
the workers contended with him by deliberately finding
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loopholes in the award system and their work morale was
low.
The workers' grievances about the factory were
mainly concerning the omership dimension of the factory.
Owing to the fact that this was a commune-run factory, the
pay and working conditions of the workers are worse than
than that of the state-owrned enterprises. In addition, as
the factory recently faced the crisis of closing down
again,the prospects of the workers seemed to be more gloomy.
If the factory closed don, they would probably be transferred
to other commune-run enterprises which were having even
much worse working conditions.
The workers were assigned to this commune-run
enterprise mainly because their domiciles were at Huan-
cheng Towr-n. Huan-cheng Tom was originally a sub-region of
the Hui-cheng Towm and at that time the people in the former
could worked in the enterprises located in the latter. Only
after the Cultural Revolution, the Huan-cheng Town was
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administratively included into the Huan-cheng Commune and
subsequently the Huan-cheng Townsmen (except for those who
had already worked in Hui-cheng Town) were assigned jobs in
the enterprises of the commune. To them, such administrative
alternation was unfair. They thought that they were equally
competent as the Hui-cheng Townsmen in working at the
state-owned factories in Hui-cheng. Some of them even had
parents or elder brothers and sisters working in Hui-cheng,
and they felt relatively deprived as compared to their own
family members. They wanted to work in Hui-cheng not only
because the state-owned enterprises were more stable and
with better working conditions, but also because they could
transfer their domiciles along with 'the new occupation.
Recently, it was officially conceded that more respect
should be given to individual interests and opinions. The
workers in general dared to openly admit their self-oriented
expectations and hopes. Moreover, as the current policies
were more lax, more people dare to avail of their back
door connections to fulfil their personal interest. Through
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personal connections, more Huan-cheng Townsmen managed to
transfer their jobs and their domicile to Hui-cheng Town.
Such practice which was informally permitted, had impacts
on the current situation of the factory.
Since the supply of subcontracting dealings sharply
decreased, not all of the workers in the factory had work
to do. But the factory still had to pay them because it
did not have the power to dismiss them. At last, the
factory authority on the one hand announced that it allowed
workers to leave and would sign their resignations, and on
the other hand, it requested the OIT to transferred some
of the apprentice and the Grade I workers to other commune-
run enterprises, and it only retained those technical
workers. But it turned out that those who managed to find
better jobs were mostly the technical workers having ao-cia-l-
social connection in the Hui-cheng Town. As a result, the
factory authority denied its previous announcement. This
changeable attitudes of the factory authority had aroused
more grievances of the workers. For the one who managed to
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find jobs in Hui-cheng but was restrained by the factory felt
that the general manager was partial to those who were per-
mitted to leave. For the majority who had to remained in
the factory and to face the fate of being assigned to other
worse commune-run enterprises felt that such transference
system was unfair.
Under these complicated circumstances, the intro-
duction of money incentive system did not raise the efficiency
and work morale of the workers. It was partly due to the
fact that the workers were not convinced by the general
manager and they deliberately picked faults in the award
s (stem, and partly because of the miscellaneous work types
-Lichse to technical problems in the design of the
award system. Among the workers of different work t-pes,
their degrees of difficulty in getting the awards were
different, and the number of bonus items they coald part-
icipate were different. Some of the enumerative methods in
calculating the amount of award for certain work t:,rpes were
actually having no direct correlation with the effort the
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worker contributed to the work. Therefore, the award system
was not universally, fairly applied to all workers and again
it aroused many complaints from the workers.
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SECTION TWO: STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS ON THE MANAGERIAL
PROBLEMS
The major managerial problems of this factory were
discontents of the workers with the managerial style of the
general manager and the assignment system which compell them
to work in this commune-run factory,
The grievances of the workers about the general
manager were mainly concerning his dictatorial style and
his partiality towards his henchmen who were appointer to
the managerial positions in the factory. The structural
factors at the organizational level that conduce to such
behaviour are:- the supreme position of the general manager
in the factory which allows him to exercise his dictator.al
and coercive man::.gerial style, and also the appointive
system that facilitates him to appoint his favourites to
the managerial positions.
The supreme power of the general manager was back up
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by the OIT and CPC. Since the factory was commune-owned,
the OIT and CPC represented the commune to appoint the
general manager and to authorize him the power to manage the
whole factory. Moreover, as a factory in Socialist system,
by principle it must be guided by the vanguard of the
working class-- i.e. the Communist Party. Thus the
appointment was based on the political stance rather than
on the managerial skills. The general manager was appointed
to the post mainly because he was the secretary of the
communist party branch in the factor. He represented the
Party and the CPC to manage the factory. Therefore, he had
the final say in all the decision made within the factory and
there was no checking system on his managerial performance,
The complaints of the workers had little impact on his posit-
ion as the general manager.
In order to assure that the factory would implement the
policies issued by the OIT and CPC, and to guarantee the
consentioneous political attitudes of the leading body of
the factory, all the FMC members, as well as the ma-nagerial
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staff were appointed. Except the deputy manager, all other
members of the FMC and the managerial staff were appointed
directly by the general manager on the behalf of the OIT and
CPC.
The appointive system used in this factory is common
in other organizations in China. Such appointive system
structurally lead to the complication of human relationships
in the organization. First of all, as the appointment is by
person, the criteria the appointor used in selecting the
appointee are not explicitly stated and the selection is
entirely based on the subjective judgement of the appointer.
This can easily make others think that the appointor is
partial to the appointee. And in fact, there is no built-in
checking mechanism to prevent the occurance of such matter.
Even if the appointee is originally not the appointor's
henchmen, the system of appointment by person facilitates
the establishment of patron-client relationship between the
appointor and the appointees. Moreover, as the appointees
are not elected through the democratic procedures, objectively
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there is no guarantee that they represent the interests and
opinions of the majority. Hence, the mechanism of the
appointive system structurally conduces the salient division
between two groups: the appointors and the appointees who
constitute the dominant group, and the non-appointees in
majority who constitute the subordinate group. The appointees
who are affiliated to the appointors, can hardly represent
the interests and opinions of the non-appointees though they
are regarded as their delegates. In the eyes of the non-
appointees, the appointees are the clients of the appointors
who would take care of (or give favours to) their own
clients (or henchmen). As a result, the human relationships
are further complicated and the conflicts between the sub-
ordinate and the dominant groups became more salient and
tense.
Hence, the supreme power authorized to the general
manager and the appointive system practised were two of the
main structural sources of the workers' grievances. But these
two structural factors which restrain the effectiveness of
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the management in the factory are in fact built-in with the
the socio-economic system of socialism. They are not
simply the organizational defects of this particular factory.
One of the fundamentals of socialist system is the public
ownership of the means of production, which are either
owned by the state or by the collective. The leading cadres
who take charge of the publicly owned enterprises, in
principle, are authorized by the public which is theoreti-
cally represented by the leaders at the higher level. It
is assumed that the leading cadres at different levels
represent the interests of the public at different levels.
For example, the CPC represents the interests of the whole
commune, the OIT represents the interests of the industrial
line within the commune, the general manager represents the
interests of the commune-owned factory which is under the
superivision of the industrial line, and at the bottom, the
individual worker represents only his o-,,-.n interests. As
socialism emphasizes the interests of the collective rather
than that of the individual, the interests of the lower
levels must be subordinated to the above levels. Therefore
231
leaders of the lower level must be appointed by the leaders
of the higher one who are supposed to be representing the
interest of a, larger collective. Moreover, as the socialist
society in principle must be guided by the communist party,
which is regarded as the vanguard of the uroletariates, the
top leading positions at all levels must be occupied by the
party members who are expected to be politically more trust-
worthy. In order to place the party members at the signifi-
cant leading positions, the appointive system is inevitable.
Also, to assure that the leading body of each level is
politically consentient, the _members of which are appointed
by the top leaders at the corresponding level. she applicat-
ion of the appointive system is to guarantee that the policies
and directives issued from above would be implemented in
accord at the levels below, but at the expenses of leading
to the high centralization of power, complication of human
relationships, patron-client relationship and the grievances
generated from the non-appointees (who are actually constitut-
ing the majority of the collective).
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The other key management problem in this factory was
concerning the dissatisfaction of the workers with their
own assignment of jobs. They disliked working in this
commune-run factory, because it only provided them poor
working conditions, and they had bad relationships with
the general manager. But there was no formal transference
channel which could help them to leave this working environ-
ment. Both the factory authority and the workers did not
have the power to break their employer-employees relation-
ship. The workers had no right to leave the factory unless
they were willing to give up their seniority. The factory
had no right to dismiss workers unless the workers committed
very serious mistakes (e. g, crime. As a result, though
both parties dissatisfied with each other,' they were being
bounded together by the job assignment system',
In the centralized job assignment system, the individual
interests and preferences are not taken into account. Those
who are assigned to job A might in fact prefer job B, and
those who are assigned to job B might prefer job A. Such
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misallocation of jobs leads to the discontents of the
workers with their assigned jobs and, as a whole, it will
be very difficult to motivate their initiative to so well
in their jobs,
Moreover, as the allocation of workers is under
unified plan, individual factory does not have the power to
control the quality of the workers. So long as the factory
cannot select its workers who are appropriate to the
specific need of the factory, it has to train the workers
on job.
General speaking, :porkers' are restrained from chosing
their jobs at their own will. This structural constraint is
rooted in the public ownership of the socialist system. The
state represents the public to allocate the means of pro-
duction and the labour. Different jobs,categorized according
to the lines,the locations and the ownerships of the working
units, are paid according to different wage scales set up
by the state. Vlorkers are assigned to different jobs
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mainly based on their inherited domiciles and class statuses,
and they are paid under under different wage scales. As the
unequal payments and different jobs assignment are based
on ascribed status that are administratively defined, it is
very difficult to convince those being assigned to bad jobs
to be content with their assignment. Moreover, as the
transference of jobs through back doors are prevalently
practised, it arouses the feelings of deprivation and unjust
among those who have to remain behind. Furthermore, as in
socialist society, all workers are protected from unemploy-
ment, the factory doses not have the power to discharge
workers. It neither controls its recruitment nor its dis-
missal of workers. Therefore, even when the factory has
insufficient tasks, it still has to keep all the workers.
This gives rise to inefficient productivity and difficulties
in management.
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SECTION TH: CONCLUDING REMARKS
In short, the causes that account for the upsurge
of grievances among the workers are of many. Among them,
the particular causes can be classified into remote as well
immediate causes. The major remote cause which concerned
with personal factor is the dictatorial and coercive man-
agerial style of the general manager. And that make the
general manager incurs ridespread resentment. The major
remote cause that concerned with social factors is the fact
that after the Cultural Revolution the Huan-cheng Town has
been included into the Huan-cheng Commune and since then
those who live there are obliged to work in the commune-run
enterprises in stead of in the state-o-rned enterprises at
Hui-cheng Tovm. As for the main immediate causes, there are
two: First, due to the readjustments in economy, this
factory is now facing the crisis of closing down and the
transference of workers becomes the current problem of the
factory. Secondly, the Hu,-n-cheng Tovmsm:en are once again
infortaally permitted to work in the state-owned enterQrises
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in Hui-cheng Town. Some of the workers are able to*find
better jobs and leave this commune-run factory but many of
them are not. The transference of job is the hindge of
the workers prospect. As the factory authority and the
workers hold opposite position on this matter, they have
open conflicts. Such conflicts interweave with the exist-
ing complicated human relationship in the factory and the
general manager again become the target of attack. These
grievances and resentments are expressed overtly as the
current political atmosphere is more tranquil and the people
have more freedom to talk.
These particular causes are not incidents that so
happened. Structural factors can be found lying behind
these causes. In this chapter, two structural factors have
been pointed out: the aprointive system and the centralized
assignment of work. And they in turn have their roots in
the socio-economic structure of the socialism system. They
restrain the organizational structure of the factory and
give rise to some of the major management problems. There-
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fore as far as this factory is concerned, the management
problems lie not only on the personality of the general
manager but also on the appointive system that authorize him
the supreme pourer and, the remedy is not just introducing
the money-incentive system but altering the job assignment
as well as the appointive systems. But unfortunately, these
systems are rooted in the structural base of the Chinese




THE OFFICIAL UPGRADING CONDITIONS FOR THE WAGE READJUSTMENT
FROGRAMIE IN 1973.
A.573-: That meant that those who had become regular workers
before 1957 and were still in the 3rd labour grade
could be promoted to the 4th labour grade.
B. 602: That meant that those who had become regular workers
before 1960 and were still in the 2nd labour grade
could be promoted to the 3rd labour grade.
C. 661: That meant that those who had become regular workers
before 1966 and were still in the 1st labour grade
could be promoted to the 2nd labour grade.
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APPEND IX II
THE MODIFIED UPGRADING CONDITIONS FOR THE WAGE READJUSTMENT
PROGRAM E IN 1973.
(1) Those who had become regular workers before 1957 and
whose salaries were be loa or equal to the 3rd grade in
the new scale (i.e. 42.00) could now receive 4.7.00)
(i.e. the 4th grade salary in the new scale) sa monthly
salary.
(2) Those who had become regular workers before 1960 and whose
salaries were below or equal to the 2nd grade in the new
scale (i.e. 37.00) could now receive 42.00 (i.e. the
3rd grade salary in the new scale) as monthly salary.
(3) Those who had become regular workers before 1966 and
whose salaries were below or equal to the 1st grade in
the new scale (i.e. 32.00) could now, receive 37.00




THE SIX FOPMAL MANAGE. 1T SYSTEvv IN THE FACTORY
A. The System of Personal ResDonsibility For One's Own
Assigned Job,
(1 Based on the practical production demands, the factory
authority assigned workers to different types of work:
smithing, benchwork, machine work, etc.
(2) Each worker, once assigned to a certain position, had
to take up full responibility and should not leave his
post without permission.
(3) As the load for each type of work differed, the factory
authority had the right to transfer workers from one
position to another. The workers should not object
without sufficient reasons.
(4) whenever visits from friends or relatives exceeded 20
minutes, one should inform the group leader and request
for permission.
B. The System For Ensuring Safety In Production
(1) Before work, one had to check the machine, and add machine
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oil if necessary.
(2) Before work, one had to tidy up one's clothes, fasten
the buttons and the sleeves.
(3) One should not wear long hair, or wear gloves at work,
so as to provent industrial accidents.
(4) All the lathe operators should wear goggles to prevent
the iron chippings and shavings darting into their eyes.
(5) Whenever one milled the lathe tools or other fittings,
one should also wear goggles
C. The Fire Prevention System
1) Smoking a tobacco bamboo-pipe was allowed in the dormitory
but not cigarettes. After smoking, the pipe should be
put outside the dormitory.
(2) Cooking was also allowed, but workers had to be sure to
extinguish all kindling after cooking.
(3) Smoking was strictly prohibited in the store houses.
Only workers with permits were allowed to enter the
store houses.
(4) Be sure to keep the calcium carbide (Dian SI 电 石




(1) According to their technical skills, specific tasks with
set time-rates were assigned directly to individual
workers by the task assigner (i.e. the deputy manager).
(2) With reference to the set time-rate, one should make
the best of the time to do well on job and raise the
quality of the products.
(3) Each worker had to report the actual time spent in the
specific tasks on the specification slips. At the end
of each day, the group leader would record them in the
register.
(4) Every month the work performance of each worker would be
announced. Those with outstanding performance would be
praised and those with bad performance had to find out
the causes and learn from the advanced experience and
example of others.
E. The Work Attendance Checking System
(1 if one needed to take leave, one should go to the group
leader and make the recuest beforehand.
(2) rhenever late or leaving more than 10 minutes early, one
should conscientiously report to the group leader.
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(3) Each worker should conscientiously and actively partici-
pate in the political, cultural, vocational, and other
recreational activities organized by the factory.
F. The System For The Keeping Of Instruments
(1) Instruments and set-ups distributed to individual
workers should be kept in order and handled with care.
(2) Outworn and damaged instruments should be returned and
exchanged for new ones. The workers had to record the
amount and types of instruments drarn from the store
house.
(3) Instruments for collective use should be kept by
specific persons. When used, the worker had to inform
the keeper, and the instruments should be returned
immediately after use.
(4) Before drawing instruments and set-ups from the store
house, one should get the per-it for entering into the
store house.
(5) Unless with permission from the factory authority, the




THE MULTIPLE ITEMS AWARD SYSTEM (19! 9
A. The Exceed Time-Rate Bonus (Chao Conk Shi Jiang ●工時獎 )
(1) For the benchwork, machine tool work, and electrical work,
a time rate was set for each piece of each task by the
deputy manager.
(2) The number of labour hour exceeded or saved would be
recorded and the total sum would be converted into money
terms at the end of each month.
(3) Terms of conversion:
in March: saved 1 hour, x0.20 awarded exceeded 1 hour,
$0.10 deducted
in April and June: saved 1 hour, :0,15 awarded,exceeded
1 hour, $0.10 deducted
(4) For the electric welding the output value target
was $800.00 per month. For every X10.00 exceeded, 10.75
would be awarded.
B. Full-Attendance Bonus (Euan ain Jiang 全勤獎 )
( 1) The work attendance as Bell as the porkers' assembly
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attendance of each worker was recorded.
(2) Whoever had been late 4 times, or left early 4 times,
or taken leave during working hours (exceeding 2 hour
considered as absent for day) 4 times, or absent (no
matter due to sickness, industrial injury, or personal
affairs) for 2 days, would not be regarded as having
full attendance for the month.
(3) The bonus for full attendance was $3.00 per month.
C. Spare-Set-ups Bonus (ru Zhu Cad- Liao Jie Shen Jiang
(1) The average amount of set-ups necessary for each type
of work was estimated by the factory. The concrete
amount was then converted into a money value and
served as the expenditure Quota of set--ups for each
worker.
(2) The set-ups expenditure quota per season for each type
of work we-le:
C615 lathe operation: $124.00
0618, C620, 0625 lathe operation: $121.00
Heavy duty lathe operation: $13.50
B665 shaping machine operation: $115.00
B350 baby shaping machine operation: $113.50
Boring machine opera Lion: $113.50
( 輔 助 材 料 节 省 獎 )
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Automatic hopping machine operation: 9.00
Universal drilling machine operation: 9.00
Electric welding: 21.00
Electric work (group): 24.00
(3) For every dollar spared (or over spent), one would be
awarded (or deducted from wage) 0.15.
产 品 質D. Product-Quality Bonus (Chan Pin Zhi Liam Jiang
量 獎
This bonus was applied to machine tool operators
only. Because only the output produced (parts and fittings)
in this workshop had to passed through the quality inspect-
ion. The details were:
(1) If no waste product was produced for the month, the
operator would be re rewarded.
(2) If he was the operator of any of the following machine:
C618, C620, C625 lathes, heavy duty lathe, boring machine,
he could have 4.50 as bonus. If he was the operator of
other machine tools, he could have 3.00 only.
(3) Whenever one produced waste products. his (rage would be
deducted accordingly. If the value of the blank was
over 100.00, the orerator had to compensate 4% of the
value. Also 50% of the labour hours originally set for
this piece of work would be converted into money terms
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and the amount would be deducted from the operator's
wage. If the value was above Y10.00 but under 100.00,
6% of the value and 60% of the labour hours would be de-
ducted from the wage. If the value of the blank was
below 10.00, 0.30 would be deducted from the wage.
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